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ABSTRACT
PEACEFUL COLLABORATION: THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO
THE COSTA RICAN REVOLUTION OF 1948 AND THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA
CRISIS OF 1948-1949

James Wilkerson
Old Dominion University, 2020
Director: Dr. Robert H. Holden
Before, during, and after the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948 and the Costa RicaNicaragua Crisis of 1948-1949, the Truman Administration maintained a posture of strict
neutrality and helped to isolate, and bring a quick end to, both conflicts. This thesis attempts to
revise the historiography of the Costa Rican Revolution by challenging the common view that
the United States inaugurated the Cold War in Latin America by facilitating the overthrow of the
communist-supported government in Costa Rica. The Truman Administration did not care who
won and only wanted the Revolution and Crisis to come to a quick end. The United States’
response to the Costa Rican Revolution and the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis was consistent with
its broader hemispheric policy of promoting peaceful collaboration among the American
republics in order to convince the Soviet Union that the Western Hemisphere was united against
international communism.
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INTRODUCTION

From 1947 to 1952 a conflict between revolutionaries and dictatorships threatened the
peace of the Caribbean and Central American regions.1 Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, after
an attempted coup d’état against him failed on February 25, 1947, exiled all known Dominican
revolutionaries involved in the plot. Juan “Juancito” Rodríguez emerged as the leader of the
exiled army, known as “Liberation Army of America,” and found sanctuary in the Cayo Confites
off the coast of Cuba. Naturally, Trujillo was outraged that the government of Cuba allowed a
Dominican revolutionary force to base its operations there, and he demanded its immediate
removal. The U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in an attempt to keep hemispheric
peace, insisted that Cuban President Ramón Grau investigate the matter and immediately remove
the threat if found. Under pressure from the United States and the Dominican Republic, Cuba
removed the revolutionary force on September 20, 1947, and Costa Rican José “Don Pepe”
Figueres persuaded “Juancito” to move his army to Costa Rica to overthrow the government
there. In December, revolutionaries from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua,
looking to overthrow the governments of Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican
Republic, signed the “Caribbean Pact,” signifying the creation of the Caribbean Legion.2
Shortly before the Legion’s formation, a crisis emerged in Costa Rica during Rafael
Angel Calderón Guardia’s tenure as Costa Rican President from 1940 to 1944. In 1942 Calderón
exiled his political enemy, Figueres, who spoke out against the president in a national radio

1

For the purposes of this thesis, I define revolutionaries simply as any group (either communist or noncommunist)
that aimed to violently overthrow any government in Latin America.
2
Charles D. Ameringer, The Caribbean Legion: Patriots, Politicians, Soldiers of Fortune, 1946-1950, (State College:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 26-74.

2

broadcast, and the two would constantly be at odds throughout the 1940s and 1950s. While in
office, Calderón implemented a series of populist reforms that diminished the power of the
oligarchy in Costa Rica, which led to an alliance between the embittered elites and ex-president
León Cortes Castro.3 In response, Calderón’s party, the Partido Republicano Nacional (PRN),
and the Vanguardia Popular (PVP), the communist party of Costa Rica, entered into an alliance
to defeat Cortes. The PRN and the PVP selected Teodoro Picado as their presidential candidate
for the 1944 elections, and in an obviously rigged election, Picado defeated Cortes. Following
the election, the Unión Nacional emerged, which was headed by newcomer, Otilio Ulate, editor
of the Costa Rican newspaper Diario de Costa Rica. Ulate, Cortes, and Figueres teamed up
during Picado’s presidency and created a united opposition against the PRN and the PVP.4
After Picado entered office, the PRN and the opposition prepared for the 1948 elections,
and both groups charged and countercharged each other with acts of fraud and intimidation.
Bombing campaigns and violent disturbances between 1946 and 1948 created an unstable
political environment in Costa Rica, which only worsened in December 1947 after opposition
leader Ulate and Calderón were officially nominated as the presidential candidates. On February
8, 1948, the results of the elections came back and the electoral tribunal declared Ulate the
victor. Immediately, the PRN and the PVP cried fraud, and Calderón appealed to the legislative
assembly, consisting mostly of PRN members, to annul the elections, which was promptly done.
With the support of the Caribbean Legion and opposition forces, Figueres responded to the
annulment by starting the Costa Rican Revolution on March 12, 1948.

3

John Patrick Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica: the 1948 Revolution, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1971), 40.
The opposition consisted of multiple political parties, including the Acción Demócrata, Partido Social Demócrata,
and Unión Nacional; Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, 108-112, 36.
4
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Just to the north, in Nicaragua, Director of the Guardia Nacional and ally to Picado,
Anastasio Somoza, actively supported the Picado government during the Revolution, despite the
United States’ strongly discouraging intervention by any of the other American republics.
Somoza feared that the Caribbean Legion, led by Figueres and materially supported by the
Guatemalan government, would look next to overthrow his puppet government in Nicaragua,
headed by Victor Manuel Román y Reyes. After Figueres defeated Picado with his revolutionary
army on April 19, Somoza harbored many of the exiled Calderonistas, which led to a vicious
cycle of charges and countercharges both by Figueres and Somoza that the other intended to
attack.5 Ultimately, the situation deteriorated into the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis of 1948-1949,
which began on December 10, 1948, when an unknown number of Calderonistas invaded
northern Costa Rica.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the Truman Administration had its hands full in dealing
with the Soviet Union. Immediately following the formation of the United Nations in October of
1945, U.S.-Soviet relations began deteriorating rapidly, and the State Department started
drawing up a contingency plan to counterbalance the potential failure of the UN. Article 52 in
the Charter of the United Nations permitted the creation of supplementary regional organizations
that fell under the jurisdiction of the UN, but these organizations were allowed to act
independently on issues concerning regional security and local disputes. The Truman
Administration, realizing that it could not depend on the UN to preserve peaceful cooperation
between the Soviet Union and the western world, immediately began planning for the creation of
regional organizations in the fall of 1945 in an effort to convince the Soviet Union that the entire

5

After the disbandment of the PRN in Costa Rica, the exiled counterrevolutionaries were commonly referred to as
“Calderonistas.”

4

world was united against it. The first regional defense system, the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 1947, would be created and tested in Latin America and
would bring an end to the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis.6
Central Argument
Before, during, and after the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948 and the Costa RicaNicaragua Crisis of 1948-1949, the Truman Administration maintained a posture of strict
neutrality and helped to isolate, and bring a quick end to, both conflicts. This thesis attempts to
revise the historiography of the Costa Rican Revolution by challenging the common view that
the United States inaugurated the Cold War in Latin America by facilitating the overthrow of the
communist-supported government in Costa Rica. The Truman Administration did not care who
won and only wanted the Revolution and Crisis to come to a quick end.
U.S.-Latin American relations during the Truman years have been the central subject of
few scholarly works, and only a handful of authors have paid close attention to the United States’
role during the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948 and the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis of 19481949. Charles D. Ameringer, Juan Carlos Zarate, Kyle Longley, John Patrick Bell, Steven
Schwartzberg, Paul L. Atwood, Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz, and Jacobo Schifter have specifically
studied this subject, and, with the addition of several other scholars, have collectively come to
three conclusions: The Truman Administration advocated for peace and stability in Central
America; suppressed the Caribbean Legion seeking to overthrow various governments in the

6

United Nations, “The Charter of the United Nations, Including the Statute of the International Court of Justice,”
June 26, 1945, Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House Central Files – Official File, in Documentary History of the
Truman Presidency, Vol. 35 The United Nations, 1945-1953: The Development of a World Organization, ed. Dennis
Miller, (Lanham, MD: University Publications of America, 1996), 168.
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region; and helped overthrow the communist-supported government in Costa Rica.7 This third
conclusion, incompatible with the first two conclusions, contributes to a fourth and final
conclusion – that Truman’s policy in Latin America, in general, and Costa Rica, specifically, was
one of “confusion,” “division,” and “contradictory desires.”8

7

For arguments that the Truman Administration advocated for peace and stability in Central America, see Bryce
Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 192; Paul L.
Atwood, The United States and Costa Rica, 1945-1960: The Containment of Liberal Nationalism, (PhD. Diss., Boston
University, 1991), 86; Juan Carlos Zarate, Forging Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Effects of U.S. Foreign
Policy on Central American Democratization, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 39; Thomas M.
Leonard, The Decline of the Recognition Policy in United States-Central American Relations, 1933-1949, (Miami, FL:
Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, 1985), 26; Steven Schwartzberg, Democracy
and U.S. Policy in Latin America during the Truman Years, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 173;
Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed., (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1993), 105; Kyle Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk: The United States and Costa Rica during the Rise of
José Figueres, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1997), 97. For arguments that the Truman
Administration suppressed the Caribbean Legion seeking to overthrow various governments in Central America,
see Charles D. Ameringer, The Caribbean Legion, Patriots, Politicians, Soldiers of Fortune, 1946-1950, (University
Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1996), 10; Leslie Bethell, “From the Second World War to the Cold War: 19441954,” in Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal, (Baltimore:
The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 63; LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 106; Atwood, Containment of Liberal
Nationalism, 84; Piero Gleijeses, “Juan Jose Arevalo and the Caribbean Legion,” Journal of Latin American Studies
21 (1989): 133-145; Zarate, Forging Democracy, 86; John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States:
The Clients and the Colossus, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 63; Schifter, Origins of the Cold War, 349;
Longley, Sparrow and the Hawk, 97. For arguments that the Truman Administration helped overthrow the
communist-supported government in Costa Rica, see Longley, “Peaceful Costa Rica, The First Battleground: The
United States and the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948,” The Americas 50, no. 2 (October 1993): 152; Schwartzberg,
Democracy and U.S. Policy, 173, 179; Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz, “Costa Rica,” in Latin America between the Second
World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948, ed. Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 293; Schifter, Origins of the Cold War, 296, 298; Atwood, Containment of Liberal
Nationalism, 74; Ameringer, Don Pepe: A Political Biography of José Figueres of Costa Rica, (Alberquerque, NM:
University of New Mexico Press, 1978), 63; Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, 150; John E. Findling, Close Neighbors, Distant
Friends: United States-Central American Relations, (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1987), 105-6; Thomas M.
Leonard, Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability, (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia
Press, 1991), 128; Leonard, The United States and Central America, 1944-1949: Perceptions of Political Dynamics,
(Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1984), 37;; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Political Economy of
Central America Since 1920, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 134,145; Coatsworth, The Clients
and the Colossus, 59; Bethell, “From the Second World War to the Cold War,” 51; LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions,
104-105.
8
Robert Freeman Smith, The Caribbean World and the United States: Mixing Rum and Coca-Cola, (New York:
Twayne Publishers, 1994), 27; Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, “The Postwar Conjuncture in Latin America:
Democracy, Labor, and the Left,” in Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948,
ed. Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24; Schwartzberg,
Democracy and U.S. Policy, 173.
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However, Marcia Olander offers an alternative look at the Truman Administration’s
hemispheric policy. Olander deconstructed, and convincingly repudiated, the longstanding
argument that the United States intervened during the Costa Rican Revolution to facilitate the
overthrow of the communist-supported government.9 Though she could not find a definitive
answer as to why the United States refused to intervene, since this was outside the scope of her
argument, Olander revealed that some historians have only been imagining a U.S. intervention
against communism in Costa Rica that in reality did not happen.10
First, allow me to explain why it is essential to take the Costa Rican Revolution into
serious consideration when trying to define the Truman Administration’s Cold War strategies in
Latin America. Some scholars, with hardly any pushback, incorrectly identify the Costa Rican
Revolution as the first known instance of the United States’ facilitating the overthrow of a
communist-supported government in the Western Hemisphere.11 If the premise is accepted that
the Truman Administration assisted the toppling of the government in Costa Rica, then one can
reasonably assume that Truman did so elsewhere in Latin America. For example, in places like
Panama and Venezuela, evidence of Truman’s facilitating the overthrow of these governments is
only circumstantial, and historians admit that it is only possible that Truman indirectly supported
these coups.12 However, the Costa Rican myth substantiates their hypotheses, and while none of

9

Anthony P. Maingot also maintained that the United States did not play an important role in the Revolution and
that “the US did not feel inclined to get involved in the Costa Rica case [since] they, along with the rest of Latin
America, were at the same time in Bogotá, Colombia hammering together the Organization of American States
(OAS).” – Anthony P. Maingot, The United States and the Caribbean: Challenges of an Asymmetrical Relationship,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994) 78-80.
10
Marcia Olander, “Costa Rica in 1948: Cold War or Local War?,” The Americas 52, no. 4 (1996): 465-493.
11
See footnote 7.
12
For Venezuela in 1948, see Bethell and Roxborough, “Postwar Conjuncture,” 29; Steve Ellner, “Venezuela,” in
Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948, ed. Leslie Bethell and Ian
Roxborough, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 167-169; For Panama in 1949, see John H.
Coatsworth, “United States Interventions: What For?,” Revista: Harvard Review of Latin America (Spring/Summer
2005): 6-9.

7

these authors cited Costa Rica, their readers can assume that if the United States helped
overthrow the government in Costa Rica, then it could have done the same in Panama and
Venezuela.
After examining U.S.-Costa Rican relations and studying the Truman Administration’s
actions in Latin America before, during, and after the Costa Rican Revolution and the Costa
Rica-Nicaragua Crisis, I believe that the circumstantial arguments – that the Truman
Administration facilitated the overthrow of various Latin American governments and encouraged
the outlawing of communism in Latin America – are very weak.13 Let me be clear, though. I am
not definitively making the claim that the Truman Administration did not facilitate these coups or
encourage the outlawing of communist parties outside of Costa Rica. However, until some direct
evidence is presented to support these claims, I propose that the assumption that Truman
facilitated the overthrow of governments and the violent suppression of communists in Latin
America should be abandoned. The first step historians must take is to dismiss the idea that Costa
Rica was the “First Latin American Battleground of the Cold War.”14
As will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, State Department officials questioned
whether outlawing communist parties, much less overthrowing communist-supported
governments, in Latin America would serve the best interests of the United States. The State
Department’s Policy Planning Staff, shortly before the Bogotá Conference began in March 1948,
decided that a study should be conducted before encouraging Latin American governments to

13

Most historians, as do I, look beyond the rhetoric of any presidential administration’s public policies by paying
attention the administration’s actions. I base my evidence throughout the thesis on confidential reports detailing
actions. Though some theoretical approach is taken in defining the Truman Administration’s hemispheric defense
plan in the final chapter, the definition of the hemispheric defense plan is largely based on what the State
Department under Truman is doing – not merely saying.
14
Quotation borrowed from Kyle Longley’s title of the fourth chapter in Sparrow in the Hawk.
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outlaw communist parties. Moreover, after the Revolution ended in Costa Rica, the U.S. embassy
was concerned that the outlawing of the Vanguardia Popular might inadvertently transform it
into a more dangerous, clandestine organization.15 I argue that, yes, the Truman Administration
had concerns about, and closely observed, communism in Latin America, but the State
Department and the U.S. Embassies also understood that simply outlawing communist parties, or
overthrowing communist-supported governments, would not necessarily eliminate the
communist threat. It was not as black and white as some historians like to imagine.16
My broader argument for Truman’s Latin American Cold War policies, then, is this:
Truman recognized that there was more than one way to fight the Cold War. In Europe and Asia
where there was a direct Soviet communist threat, Truman armed and financed noncommunist
governments to counter the USSR’s growing influence and to directly suppress communists in
the Eastern Hemisphere.17 Meanwhile, in Latin America, the United States believed that
communist parties were “within the power orbit of the United States” and did not warrant violent
intervention.18 In order to fight the Cold War in only one hemisphere at a time, Truman urged his

15

Citations below.
For example, Greg Grandin without any supporting evidence asserted that by 1947, “U.S. Embassies began to
pressure governments to proscribe Communist parties.” – Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America
in the Cold War, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 8-9; Though Bethell and Roxborough claimed that in
Cuba and Brazil “it was not necessary for the United States to intervene directly, even behind the scenes, to secure
the proscription of Communist parties and the purging of Communists and other militants from labor unions,” they
asserted without evidence that “there was a general awareness of Washington’s approval of such measures.” –
Bethell and Roxborough, “Postwar conjuncture,” 26. Others have recognized that the United States did not play a
hand in the outlawing of communism or severing ties with the Soviet Union in some countries. Andrew Barnard in
“Chile” on page 90, argued that in proscribing communism and “breaking off relations with the Soviets, [Garbriel
González Videla] was not responding to any direct pressure or request from the State Department.” – Andrew
Barnard, “Chile,” in Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948, ed. Leslie Bethell
and Ian Roxborough, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 90.
17
Arnold A. Offner, "‘Another Such Victory’: President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold
War." Diplomatic History 23, no. 2 (1999): 139-153.
18
Central Intelligence Agency, “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,”
September 26, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s Files – National Security Council Meetings,
in Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, Vol. 23 The Central Intelligence Agency, ed. Dennis Miller,
(Lanham, MD: University Publications of America, 1996), 215.
16
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Latin American counterparts to cooperate in peaceful collaboration (see definition below) so that
the Soviet Union’s attention might not be drawn toward the Western Hemisphere.
Methodology and Interpretive Premises
Initially, I began this project by investigating the Truman and Eisenhower
Administrations’ influence on, and reaction to, Costa Rica’s disbandment of its military. Only a
few historians have touched on this issue, and no one has dedicated significant space to answer
this question.19 After reading Olander’s article, I realized that I needed to redefine the Truman
Administration’s Costa Rican policy within the broader context of the Cold War in order to
understand Washington’s influence on, and reaction to, Costa Rica’s disbanding its military.
First, I began by sifting published documentary histories of the Truman Administration at the
Old Dominion University Perry Library in Norfolk, Virginia, and then I traveled to the U.S.
National Archives in College Park, Maryland, to examine the Truman and Eisenhower
Administrations’ political and military relations with Costa Rica from 1945 to 1955. Primarily I
searched through State Department communications in Record Group (RG) 59, but I also sifted
RGs 263 (CIA), 319 (Army Staff), and 165 (Military Intelligence Division).20 Upon my return to
Norfolk, I organized the evidence and began writing.

19

John Gardner, The Costa Rican Junta of 1948-49, (PhD. Diss., St. John’s University, 1971), 225-226; Longley,
Sparrow and the Hawk, 96; Zarate, Forging Democracy, 36; Schifter, Origins of the Cold War, 349-350; Kirk
Bowman, “Militaries and Modern States: The Comparative Evidence from Costa Rica and Honduras,” in
Demilitarization in the Contemporary World, ed. Peter Stearns, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 195.
20
List of published material includes: Department of State Bulletin; Foreign Relations of the United States; Robert
H. Holden and Eric Zolov, Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000); Louis W. Koenig, The Truman Administration, Its Principles and Practice, (New York: New
York University Press, 1956); Dennis Merrill, Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, (Bethesda, MD:
University Publications of America, 1995); Organization of American States, Department of Legal Affairs, InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 1-3, (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1973).
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For the purposes of this thesis, I define the Cold War from the Truman Administration’s
perspective, as a direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and not between
the general concepts of capitalism and communism. From the perspective of the State
Department,21 there existed a stark difference between national communists – commonly referred
to as “local” communists by U.S. officials – who operated outside of the power orbit of the
Soviet Union, and international communists, who practiced Soviet-style communism.22 More
specifically, local communists in Latin America, from the State Department’s and CIA’s
perspective, did not pose a serious threat to the hemisphere and often practiced their own unique
brand of communism within their nation’s borders. Meanwhile, international communist parties
worked closely with Moscow to initiate subversive movements, lead revolts, and dismantle
noncommunist governments. The U.S. embassy only perceived the PVP as a “local” communist
party, and international communism, from the perspective of the State Department and CIA, did
not yet pose a serious enough threat in Latin America for Truman to intervene.23
Since the American republics, from Washington’s perspective, were geographically and
politically isolated from the dangers of the Cold War, the Truman Administration promoted
peaceful collaboration in Latin America. “Peaceful collaboration” refers to the Truman
Administration’s policy of promoting hemispheric peace and nonintervention among all

21

The State Department and War/Defense Departments disagreed on key issues, such as a Latin American arms
program and multilateral defense site agreements, but the State Department had the final say in implementing
U.S. policy in Latin America. The War and Defense Departments had bigger concerns in the Eastern Hemisphere.
22
For State Department officials, “local” means “national.” Other historians have also noticed that the State
Department made a distinction between local (or national) and international communists. See, for example,
Thomas M. Leonard, Central America and the United States Policies, 1820s-1980s: A Guide to Issues and
References, (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1985), 56. The argument of whether communists in Latin America were
actually tied to Moscow is outside of the scope of this thesis. I simply am conveying to my audience how the State
Department perceived communism in the Western Hemisphere.
23
Bethell and Roxborough also noted that the “CIA review of Soviet aims in Latin America in November 1947
contended there was no possibility of a Communist takeover anywhere in the region.” – Bethell and Roxborough,
“Postwar conjuncture,” 26.
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American republics in order to avoid a violent conflict that might draw the attention of the Soviet
Union toward the Western Hemisphere. In promoting peaceful collaboration, the United States
reacted to the Costa Rican Revolution and the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis by isolating – or
“localizing” – the conflicts or, in other words, preventing state-sanctioned and revolutionary
violence from spreading beyond the internationally defined borders of either Costa Rica or
Nicaragua.24 Simultaneously, it discouraged other governments from materially or militarily
intervening in the conflicts in order to prevent the violence from escalating into a regional
conflict.25 The United States also maintained a policy of strict neutrality throughout the Costa
Rican Revolution and the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis, meaning that it was careful not to show
favoritism or antagonism, by giving or withholding moral and material support, either to Costa
Rica or Nicaragua. Furthermore, Figueres’ disbanding of the constitutional army in Costa Rica
meant very little to the United States, since this did virtually nothing to improve the unstable
situation brewing in Central America. Embassy officials viewed it as a purely political move that
was intended to increase Figueres’ popularity among the Costa Rican populace.
Chapter-by-Chapter Breakdown
The first chapter, “Setting the Stage: U.S.-Costa Rican Relations in 1947,” examines the
Truman Administration’s appraisals, respectively, of the opposition, the PRN, and the PVP. The
U.S. embassy had concerns about all three political groups, regardless of their ideologies, but it
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primarily wanted to prevent violence from erupting between the opposition and the PRN. In
their appraisals of the PVP, U.S. Ambassadors Hallett Johnson and Walter J. Donnelly both
concluded that it did not constitute a serious international communist threat. Therefore, the
Truman Administration adhered to a policy of strict neutrality in Costa Rica in 1947 in the hopes
that the three political organizations would settle their differences in a relatively peaceful
manner.
The second chapter, “‘Localizing’ the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948,” enters into
conversation with Marcia Olander and Kyle Longley. While Olander effectively dismantled
Longley’s argument, I support her claim with evidence that suggests that the United States had
no reason to choose sides during the Revolution. Washington officials only did damage control
by consulting with other Central American and Caribbean countries. Ultimately, I argue that the
Truman Administration successfully isolated the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948 by remaining
neutral and by discouraging other countries from intervening.
The third chapter, “Promoting Peaceful Collaboration: The United States’ Response to
the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis of 1948-1949,” argues that Washington refused to give Figueres
weapons because they would likely be used against Somoza. In addition, the Truman
Administration sought to end the revolutionary activity (communist and noncommunist alike)
existing in both countries, and it assisted the Organization of American States in isolating and
ending the conflict. The dissolution of Costa Rica’s constitutional army had little effect on the
defense of the hemisphere against Soviet communism and did nothing to bring an end to the
crisis. Neither did the Costa Rican army pose a serious threat to the peace of the hemisphere, as
the Truman Administration understood that Somoza’s much larger Guardia Nacional would keep
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it in check. Therefore, the Truman Administration largely ignored the disbandment of the small
army and demanded Figueres disband the Caribbean Legion as well.
The final chapter, “‘Waging Peace in the Americas’: The Truman Administration’s
Hemispheric Defense Plan,” as the title suggests, defines the Truman Administration’s
hemispheric defense plan that guided the embassy’s actions during the Costa Rican Revolution
and the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis. Historians tend to narrowly focus on the passage of
Resolution XXXII at the Bogotá Conference, which denounced international communism as a
totalitarian doctrine, and conclude that this signified the inauguration of the Cold War in Latin
America, where the United States actively sought the violent eradication of communists living in
the Western Hemisphere. However, I argue that the United States did not yet perceive there to be
a serious international communist threat lurking in Latin America, and, instead, the Truman
Administration promoted peaceful collaboration among all American republics in order to
convince the Soviet Union that the Western Hemisphere was united against international
communism.26 This policy differed drastically from Dwight D. Eisenhower’s strategy of directly
intervening in Latin America, most notably in Guatemala, to violently overthrow communistsupported governments and forcefully suppress communist activity.
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CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE STAGE: U.S.-COSTA RICAN RELATIONS IN 1947

Throughout 1947, the U.S. embassy in Costa Rica reported to Washington the unstable
political situation brewing in San José in response to the upcoming presidential elections in
February 1948. However, this caused relatively little alarm among high-ranking State
Department officials, who unanimously urged the embassy to maintain a neutral position and
accept all visitors from members of the two parties in power, the Partido Republicano Nacional
(PRN) and the Vanguardia Popular (PVP), as well as from their opponents. While the embassy
kept a watchful eye on the PVP, which had ties with the Communist International until its
disbandment in 1943, the reports sent to Washington often emphasized that the PVP and its
leader, Manuel Mora Valverde, were merely “local” communists with no direct connections to
Moscow. Though the political unrest in Costa Rica alarmed the U.S. embassy, Washington
officials were more concerned with Argentina and the drafting of the Rio Treaty, and they
largely ignored Costa Rica.27
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first two sections present a side-by-side
comparison of the State Department’s assessments of the two main political factions in Costa
Rica. This comparative approach reveals that the U.S. embassy had serious concerns about both
the opposition and the PRN, and, therefore, the officials in Washington ordered the embassy
maintain a posture of strict neutrality. The third section demonstrates that the Truman
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Administration’s high-ranking officials, across the board, did not perceive the PVP in Costa
Rica, or communism in Latin America, as a serious threat in 1947.28 Ultimately, this chapter
argues that the Truman Administration maintained a policy of strict neutrality throughout 1947
in an attempt to keep the peace between the PRN and the opposition, in order to avoid a civil
war. The PVP was largely irrelevant.
The United States’ Appraisal of the Opposition
The U.S. embassy in 1947 believed that the opposition coalition, consisting of the Acción
Demócrata, Partido Social Demócrata, and Unión Nacional, had little chance to win the 1948
presidential election. The PRN had a popular leader, Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, who
effectively centralized his coalition and increased its numerical support by allying with the PVP.
Meanwhile, the opposition, after ex-president León Cortes passed away in 1946, was without a
strong leader to unite the three political parties. Otilio Ulate eventually emerged as the
opposition’s chief and presidential candidate, but the embassy still doubted his capability to unite
the coalition. Due to the opposition’s weak political condition, the embassy feared that the loose
coalition would lose the election and, thereafter, resort to violence.
On December 20, 1946, the U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Hallett Johnson, reported to
Washington that the opposition had no justification for revolutionary action. After receiving
news that one of the opposition leaders, Alberto Oreamuno, was leaving for Washington,
Johnson suggested to the Office of American Republic Affairs (ARA) that it should express to
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Oreamuno that the U.S. government is more friendly “toward a healthy and sane opposition”
than toward an opposition that pushes its cause “through terroristic and similar acts of violence.”
The “acts of violence” to which Johnson referred were the frequent, yet ineffective, bombing
campaigns committed by members of the opposition against the PVP and the Costa Rican
government. These were indicative, according to Johnson, “that the more fanatical leaders of the
Opposition have been unable to organize a popular revolutionary movement.”29
Though Johnson believed members of the opposition to be “fanatical” and that the
Truman Administration should encourage Ulate and Oreamuno not to resort to violence, the
State Department decided it best not to request a visit from Oreamuno during his trip to
Washington, since he was not invited there by the State Department. The Chief of the Division of
Central America and Panama Affairs (CPA), Robert Newbegin, believed that such a request
“might well be considered as unwarranted interference on our part.” The Secretary of State
agreed with Newbegin’s position and informed Johnson that while the United States would
“gladly receive Alberto Oreamuno…it does not seem appropriate for the Department to initiate
conversation.”30
Rumors also emerged that the opposition was receiving personnel and material support
from outside Costa Rica’s borders. On January 14, Johnson reported that “certain members of the
Nicaraguan Opposition” were combining their efforts with the Costa Rican opposition. In a
message circulated throughout the department, Area Specialist of the CPA, William Tapley
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Bennett, Jr., made a note that the election day in Nicaragua, February 2, “is mentioned as a
possible date for further subversive attempts in Costa Rica.” The Costa Rican government feared
that the Nicaraguan and Costa Rican oppositions would join forces to oust the Picado
administration and then look next to overthrow Somoza in Nicaragua. Ambassador Johnson, in
response to these rumors, proposed that the State Department send a destroyer to Costa Rica as a
show of force, which could serve as a “deterrent to subversive activities.” However, the CPA
recommended that the Department deny Johnson’s request.31
Johnson again reported to the State Department on January 31 that the opposition was
putting together an “effective subversive campaign” to oust the Picado government, and he
requested again that a destroyer be sent down as a show of force. This time Spruille Braden
directly responded to the embassy that a destroyer would not be sent since “it would be risky
under present circumstances and might result in allegations of intervention.” Two days after the
Nicaraguan elections took place, the Costa Rican Minister of Public Security, René Picado,
visited the house of Calderón, which sparked further outrage by the opposition since this was
blatant evidence of the Costa Rican government’s unabashed support of Calderón. Johnson, who,
since 1945, had been rather optimistic that a revolution could be avoided in Costa Rica,
expressed his newfound pessimism that “the situation has now changed” and that “perennial talk
of the opposition may be transformed into action.” While the U.S. Ambassador remarked that the
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visit between the minister and Calderón was foolish, he still believed that there did not exist a
legitimate excuse for a revolution to occur.32
On February 13, a convention held by the Acción Demócrata, Partido Social Demócrata,
and Unión Nacional chose Ulate as the coalition’s chief, thus officially uniting the three political
parties under one leader. In his acceptance speech, Ulate remarked “that the redemption of Costa
Rica must be obtained by any means and at any sacrifice.” Johnson did not believe Ulate to be a
strong enough leader capable of uniting the three parties, and he commented that Ulate’s
nomination as the opposition’s leader made the election of Calderón “more probable.” Johnson
feared that a PRN victory would inevitably result in the opposition’s resorting to violence.33
The U.S. Ambassador also found the opposition to be hypocritical in choosing Ulate as
supra-chief of the three parties. On March 27, after Calderón announced his candidacy for the
PRN candidate, Johnson recorded that Ulate threatened to withhold the nomination of an official
candidate “until it becomes clear whether there will be ‘free elections’ in February 1948.”
Johnson remarked that the battle cry of “free elections” by the opposition was ironic since “many
crooked votes were cast in the convention which named Ulate chief.” It would therefore, in the
Ambassador’s opinion, be “somewhat illogical” for the opposition to refuse to name a candidate
or refuse to vote at the presidential elections merely because of “their apprehension that the
elections will not be free.”34

32

Johnson to Marshall, “Pacific Railroad Track is Bombed, Apparently as Part of Organized Subversive Campaign on
Part of Opposition; Conversation with Minister of Public Security,” January 30, 1947, NARA, RG 59, 818.00/1-3047;
Spruille Braden to Johnson, “The Assistant Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Costa Rica,” February 3, 1947,
FRUS, 1947 VIII, 579; Johnson to Marshall, “Political Situation Tense,” February 4, 1947, NARA, RG 59, 818.00/2447.
33
Johnson to Marshall, “The Ambassador to Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” February 14, 1947, NARA, RG 59,
818.00/2-1347; Johnson to Marshall, “Nomination of Otilio Ulate as Opposition Leader Does Little to Solidify
Political Situation,” February 14, 1947, NARA, RG 59, 818.00/2-1447.
34
Johnson to Marshall, “Internal Political Situation,” March 27, 1947, NARA, RG 59, 818.00/3-2747.

19

Furthermore, the opposition frequently attacked the U.S. embassy for acting on behalf of
the PVP and the PRN. For instance, the military mission in Costa Rica had an active hand in
training the small mobile unit, which the U.S. Army mission considered to be the “nucleus” of
Costa Rica’s military and the most disciplined and apolitical of the other units. However, the
opposition often expressed its fear that the highly trained unit would “be used to prevent free
elections” and blamed the U.S. embassy for giving Picado this potentially dangerous weapon. On
March 28, after Johnson announced his resignation, he reported to Marshall that both major
political parties attempted to “exploit” his resignation and that the opposition in particular
inferred that the Ambassador was relieved because he had “been too closely in touch” with the
government, the PRN, and the PVP.35
Johnson would not leave until May 16, though, and he continued monitoring the
opposition’s situation in order to properly brief the incoming Ambassador. On April 3, Johnson
made a note that José Figueres emerged as the central figure within the opposition most likely to
start a civil war in case of a PRN victory. The Ambassador reported that Figueres was one of
Calderón’s “bitterest enemies” and that “he is a firebrand” and “not a practical politician.” He
also added that Figueres’ unique ideology mixed elements of “[a]uthoritarianism and certain
precepts of socialism” together, causing “his policy to be a confused one.”36 Frequent rumors of
Figueres’ and the opposition’s seeking outside aid also helped shape Johnson’s negative opinions
of the “firebrand.”
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On April 8, Costa Rican Foreign Minister, Julio Acosta, approached Johnson and
expressed his concern that the opposition had apparently been smuggling arms from Guatemala
into Costa Rica with the intent to overthrow the government. Acosta reminded Johnson of the
regional conflict brewing in Central America and “that he did not trust President Arévalo who
has a mania for bringing about Central American union.”37 The Foreign Minister further asserted
that Arévalo might be planning to overthrow certain governments in the region, particularly the
dictatorships of Somoza and Tiburcio Carías, to get rid of the opposition against Central
American union. According to various rumors, Arévalo intended to dismantle the Picado regime
in order to use Costa Rica as a base of operations for his future missions. Johnson heard similar
rumors that same day from the Salvadoran Chargé d’Affairs.38 However, there is nothing in the
subsequent record regarding these possibilities.
Still, the opposition’s repeated attempts to smuggle arms into Costa Rica from other
countries caused some alarm within the U.S. embassy. U.S. Chargé John Willard Carrigan on
June 26 noted that Figueres left the country for Cuba, “possibly in an effort to purchase arms.”
The following day, the new U.S. Ambassador, Walter J. Donnelly, also reported that Figueres
departed for Cuba because “he intends to purchase arms and to gain other support for the cause
of the opposition.” These rumors were confirmed on July 10, when U.S. Vice Consul Alex A.
Cohen received reliable information that Figueres attempted to purchase weapons while in Cuba,
though he ultimately failed. After being denied material assistance from Cuba, Figueres
reportedly tried to convince the Cuban government to allow the shipment of weapons from
Mexico into Cuba then to Costa Rica, but this, too, was unsuccessful. The embassy informed the
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Department that Figueres had traveled to Guatemala and Salvador to lobby for physical and
moral support for the opposition’s cause in Costa Rica.39
Meanwhile, tensions between the opposition and the Picado regime within the Costa
Rican borders intensified. After Costa Rican policemen unsuccessfully attempted to break up a
demonstration by the opposition in Cartago, a street brawl erupted, resulting in the death of one
of the opposition’s members. Donnelly informed the State Department that he feared that either
the government or the opposition “may provoke an incident with serious consequences.”
Moreover, the opposition once again blamed the United States for furnishing weapons to the
Picado government, which the opposition alleged the police used to kill the victim. That night,
July 24, Alberto Oreamuno and other prominent opposition members visited Donnelly and
informed him that they held the United States “partially responsible” for the “ten persons killed
and twenty wounded.”40 Donnelly tried to pacify his visitors’ anger before leaving for
Washington to help Marshall get ready for the Rio Conference, but Oreamuno’s and the
opposition’s minds were set. The U.S. embassy would be held responsible by the opposition for
all future casualties inflicted by U.S. weapons in Costa Rica.
After Donnelly left for Washington on July 29, Carrigan took charge of the embassy and
reminded Ulate and his supporters that the State Department would remain neutral during Costa
Rica’s upcoming election. When the opposition candidate persisted in his efforts to get U.S.
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support, an agitated Carrigan wrote to Washington “that it was somewhat annoying to find
people trying to drag us in against our will.” In Washington, Donnelly was requested by Rafael
Oreamuno, Alberto Oreamuno’s brother living in the United States, to see members of the
opposition while in D. C. Donnelly informed Rafael that he had accepted visitors shortly before
his departure from San José and that if they had any more questions, they should raise them with
the U.S. embassy in Costa Rica. Donnelly then emphasized to him that the Truman
Administration “would continue to maintain a neutral position” and that the chances of the
Department receiving any delegation from San José were unlikely since “everyone was so busy
with preparations with the Rio Conference.”41
The opposition, in an apparent retaliation to Donnelly’s response, began a letter-writing
campaign directly to President Truman to try to solicit a reaction from him. These letters
consisted of claims of U.S. arms “in the hands of a ferocious mob of communist bullies firing on
unarmed and peaceful crowds” and complaints of U.S. citizens who were “engaged in teaching
bad Costa Ricans to intimidate the people of Costa Rica.” In addition, on August 8, in a
communication to the U.S. embassy from the town of Escazú, an anonymous writer requested
that “the arms which the United States placed in the hands of our Government for Continental
Defense may be withdrawn, in order to keep the Government from continuing the massacre of
our defenseless people.”42 Still, the U.S. embassy and the State Department saw through the
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opposition’s charades – particularly its “anti-communist” demonstrations and its numerous
attempts to guilt-trip the State Department into taking away U.S. weapons already in the Costa
Rican government’s possession – and consistently replied, despite these charges, that the United
State would remain neutral in the upcoming elections.
After these approaches failed, the opposition tried yet another strategy to garner U.S.
support. On August 20, Carrigan visited the house of wealthy Costa Rican citizen, Victor Manuel
Yglesias, to discuss the new location of the U.S. embassy. However, he was surprised to find that
Ulate had been invited to the meeting as well, and upon his arrival, the opposition leader
approached Carrigan and started talking about the upcoming elections. After speaking at length
on the opposition’s typical charge of the Picado government’s misusing U.S. weapons, Ulate
then accused Calderón of possessing “Communist leanings.” Carrigan shut the conversation
down immediately, “since it might have proved embarrassing to a degree such that it might have
been wise for me to leave.”43 As will be expanded upon in the third section of this chapter, the
U.S. embassy throughout 1947 did not perceive there to be a serious communist threat lurking in
Costa Rica, and, therefore, Carrigan did not feel that it was appropriate to hear accusations of a
presidential candidate’s “Communist leanings.”
Shortly before his permanent departure from the U.S. embassy at the end of October,
Donnelly gave his farewells to Calderón and Ulate and made it clear to both candidates that the
embassy, after his departure, would continue to maintain a position of strict neutrality and
nonintervention. As a note of interest, Donnelly’s last remarks about Ulate were rather
unflattering. He described the leader of the opposition as a “relatively incoherent” politician
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who “spoke in terms of vague generalities, and left a comparatively unfavorable impression.”44
Efforts by the opposition to pull the United States into Costa Rican matters became much less
frequent after Donnelly’s departure.
After a relatively quiet fall, Ulate made international news in November during a political
gathering in Panama, where he gave a speech riddled with revolutionary undertones. Ulate
visited a large group of Costa Ricans living in Panama, and, according to the U.S. Ambassador in
Panama City, Carlos G. Hall, Ulate “predicted that the semi-dictatorship of CALDERON and
Communism would be suppressed by the people in 1948 as the dictatorship of TINOCO had
been abolished in 1919.”45 Federico Tinoco served as a dictator in Costa Rica from 1917 to 1919,
and his removal from office served as a symbol for the opposition, and for many Costa Ricans,
of the people’s reclaiming their political power.46 The mention of Tinoco in Ulate’s speech was
not insignificant. After Ulate received the formal nomination as the opposition’s presidential
candidate on December 9, the stage was officially set for the chaos that would take over Costa
Rica in 1948.
This section argues, then, that the U.S. embassy was extremely cautious in its dealings
with the opposition, and the relationship between the embassy and Ulate had undertones of
mistrust and, at times, animosity. There is no evidence in the U.S. embassy’s appraisal of the
opposition in 1947 that suggests that the Truman Administration would have cast its lot with the
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opposition to dismantle the government during the Revolution of 1948. In Washington,
diplomatic officials were largely indifferent toward the opposition.
The United States’ Appraisal of the PRN
On the other hand, the United States’ relations with Calderón and Picado were neither
friendly nor hostile, but rather ambiguous. Throughout 1947, the embassy’s attitude toward the
government and the PRN fluctuated from positive to negative, never showing a clear pattern of
approval or disapproval of the regime. Similar to Truman’s relationship with the opposition,
officials in Washington remained rather indifferent toward the Costa Rican government and the
PRN.
Though Johnson frequently praised Picado for his efforts to implement reforms to ensure
freer elections, Picado’s brother and Minister of Public Security, General René Picado, worried
the U.S. Ambassador, since René was constantly accused of selectively enforcing the law to
support the PRN while simultaneously undermining the opposition.47 On January 30, 1947,
Johnson reported that René, “unlike his brother…believes in strong measures against those
disturbing the public peace.” Johnson perceived trouble on the horizon after a private meeting
was held between General Picado and Calderón, which the opposition seized as proof that
Calderón had the support of the army and that, therefore, the “elections will not be free.” The
U.S. Ambassador only remarked of the General’s actions that they were unwise, since this
provoked “inflammatory articles to be printed in the opposition press.” Despite René’s actions,
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Johnson still had faith in the Costa Rican president that he “will do everything that may prove
possible for him to do in an effort to secure free elections.”48
On March 27, after the opposition threatened that it would not name a presidential
candidate until it was guaranteed that there would be free elections, the U.S. Ambassador
asserted that it had enjoyed “complete political liberty” and “complete liberty of speech and of
the press” under the Picado presidency. Furthermore, Johnson noted that not a single person had
been thrown in jail for political reasons during Picado’s tenure in office and that the midterm
elections had been conducted in a fair manner. Despite this, the opposition had a history of
charging the Picado regime with repressing civil liberties, and the party members boldly asserted
that “they have enough guns in the country to permit their putting out the Government by
force.”49
Though concerned about these claims, Johnson continuously cautioned Washington
against giving the Costa Rican government weapons in order not to stir up any more trouble.
When the opposition newspaper, Diario de Costa Rica, on February 13 exposed Costa Rican
Ambassador Francisco de P. Gutierrez’s request for an export license for U.S. weapons, Johnson
wired the State Department urging it to deny him the license. The U.S. Ambassador and the
military attaché agreed that the “arms in present possession of [the] Government [are] adequate
to preserve law and order.” In a meeting with the Costa Rican Ambassador, Marshall informed
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Gutierrez that the grand total of Costa Rica’s Lend Lease account amounted to $153,502.07. The
Secretary of State then stated that of the grand sum, Costa Rica was responsible for payment of
$83,000 and that “[n]o payments have been received to date.” The request for an export license
for arms, then, was denied. However, the U.S. government on February 14 granted an export
license to Picado for ammunition for “small arms already in possession of [the] Costa Rican
[government].”50
Of course, the export license for small arms ammunition made a bigger splash in the
Costa Rican news than it probably should have. On February 20, both the opposition and
government newspapers took Marshall’s approval for an export license for ammunition and
inflated it into national headlines. In response to Ulate’s charge that the Costa Rican President
planned to use U.S. weapons to shut down the opposition, Picado stated that his administration
only “endeavored to renew certain of the armament required in moderate amounts by the police
and the cuarteles.” Picado further pointed out that former presidents, including the late Leon
Cortes, “periodically replaced such military equipment as they considered necessary” and that
this was a “natural and logical” measure taken by the government. Johnson noted that Picado did
not reveal the small amount of ammunition received by the government, possibly to keep the
opposition “in the dark” regarding the actual material involved in the purchase.51
Though Johnson discouraged the sale of weapons to Picado, this did not mean that he or
the military mission were leaving the Costa Rican government defenseless against subversion.
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Again, on March 27, Johnson and the military mission assessed the arms situation in Costa Rica,
and despite Ulate’s repeated assertions that the opposition could take the government by force,
the U.S. embassy was convinced that Picado “has at present sufficient arms and ammunition to
maintain public order.”52
Johnson did, however, continue to advise Washington officials not to formally interact
with the unpredictable General Picado. After hearing rumors that the War Department planned to
give a decoration to René, the U.S. Ambassador urged General Willis D. Crittenberger in
Panama to refrain from such action. Johnson continued to press the matter, and the State
Department finally assured him that Crittenberger would not decorate General Picado without
first consulting the U.S. embassy. Furthermore, General Picado tried “to procure 26 Thompson
submachine guns” from the United States, but William Tapley Bennett, Jr., reassured a worried
Johnson that the State Department would block the purchase. After the general’s request for the
submachine guns was officially rejected, Gutierrez approached the Department on March 21 and
asked the assistant chief of the CPA, Murray M. Wise, to keep the matter quiet so that the
opposition could not claim that the United States was antagonistic toward Picado. The State
Department complied.53
Johnson on March 28 announced his resignation as U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica. The
opposition gladly received the news of Johnson’s resignation, but so did the PRN who claimed
that Johnson had been “too close to the Opposition.” The U.S. Ambassador took the comments
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from both parties as evidence of his “steering a completely neutral and middle course.”54
Johnson’s actions throughout his tenure support this claim.
Donnelly then stepped in as Ambassador in June 1947, and though he sometimes
expressed distrust toward the PRN, he maintained the policy of strict neutrality. The first issue
that arose between Donnelly and President Picado was the arms question. Picado approached the
new U.S. Ambassador on July 15 and expressed his hope that the Truman Administration “would
agree to exchange the present armaments…for American-made armaments.” Donnelly then
asked if Picado considered this an urgent matter, to which the president responded that he did
not. Donnelly then suggested to Picado that he should wait until the U.S. Congress passed the
proposed arms bill (H.R. 6326) to exchange old and foreign weapons for new U.S. arms.55
However, Donnelly’s real intention in discouraging an arms exchange, perhaps, was to
keep U.S. weapons out of Calderón’s hands. On July 21, Donnelly said he believed that Colonel
Manuel Rodriguez, assistant secretary of Public Security during Calderón’s presidency, only
sought to procure weapons to suppress the opposition during the elections. Moreover, Donnelly
was conscious of the opposition’s attempts to blame the United States for the murder of Costa
Ricans by U.S. arms, and after a riot erupted in late July, resulting in the death of one of the
members of the opposition, Donnelly reported that the opposition held the United States
responsible.56 For Donnelly, the shipment of more weapons to Costa Rica would only result in
more accusations of murder being leveled against the United States.
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Moreover, the U.S. embassy in Costa Rica received reports from members of the
opposition that the PRN “brought in by air from Nicaragua twenty members [of the] Guardia
Nacional fully equipped with machine guns.” Donnelly ensured his visitors that though he was
departing the next day for Washington to help prepare for the upcoming Rio Conference, the
U.S. embassy would investigate these charges.57 Nothing ever came of the investigation. Upon
his arrival in Washington, Donnelly reported to the State Department that he “had maintained a
position of absolute neutrality.”58
After Donnelly’s departure, Carrigan reported back to Washington that stores, shops, and
banks started closing en masse due to the unstable political situation in Costa Rica. The Costa
Rican government tried to mandate the continued operation of private businesses, and members
of the PVP and the PRN even threatened to “attack upon closed stores,” which they believed
were closing in order to undermine the Picado presidency and make the PRN’s economic
policies look worse than they actually were. Carrigan, on August 28, observed that the police
refused to intervene when looters vandalized private property, and he even noted that certain of
the policemen “waved at looters and were cheered by them.” Though Carrigan considered the
situation to be serious enough “to warrant an official protest to the Government,” Wise and
Donnelly decided that the “protest should be made informally and verbally.” The Chargé went
on the record protesting the State Department’s decision, noting that “two American stores had
been damaged, one American gassed, and that the trolley company operated by American
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interests had been ordered to resume service,” though it had no insurance.59 However, the
Truman Administration, as of June 26, had abandoned its policy of intervention through official
diplomatic channels when it had fully reestablished normal relations with Argentina in order to
complete the Rio Treaty in September.60 The State Department, after the announcement of the
Truman Doctrine in March 1947, decided that the continuance of cordial relations with each
Latin American country was essential in order to draft the Rio Treaty. In other words, the higher
echelons of the State Department wanted Carrigan’s protest to be made “informally and
verbally” so that there was no written record of the United States’ protesting to a Latin American
government. That way it could deny any accusation of unilateral intervention, which in turn
could upset other Latin American states and prolong the Rio Treaty’s completion.
Though concerned about the Costa Rican government’s apathy toward the vandalization
of closed shops, Carrigan followed the Department’s instructions and maintained a neutral
posture. The embassy throughout the rest of the summer continuously rejected both the Costa
Rican government’s and the opposition’s requests for the United States to intervene,
diplomatically or materially, to support their cause. Despite the government’s “indiscriminate
use of untrained armed forces” against the opposition, the embassy kept a safe distance from the
action.61
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Upon his return to San José, Donnelly reported that Picado found himself under pressure
to officially recognize Victor Román y Reyes’ government in Nicaragua, which had entered
office through a coup d’état on May 26, 1947. The U.S. Ambassador warned the State
Department that “efforts are being made [by Picado] to draw me in as an intermediary” and that
“unless some formula is promptly found, Costa Rica may very easily recognize Román y Reyes.”
After World War II ended, the United States, along with a vast majority of Latin American
countries, including Costa Rica, decided it best not to recognize de facto regimes that had risen
to power through the force of arms in order to discourage violent revolutionary activity in other
Latin American countries. Acting Secretary of State Lovett responded to Donnelly that while he
could not understand Picado’s decision to act outside of unison with the rest of the hemisphere,
the United States did “not wish to influence in any way what Costa Rica may do.”62 Costa Rica
then recognized Román y Reyes in December 1947.
The last quarter of 1947 was relatively quiet for the U.S. embassy, likely due to
Calderón’s and Ulate’s preparing for the upcoming presidential elections. On December 9, both
were formally selected as presidential candidates, officially marking the beginning of the
campaign season. If it is unclear as to who the U.S. embassy hoped would win, that is because it
was. This chapter has tried to demonstrate that the U.S. embassy showed considerable distrust
both toward Calderón and Ulate, and especially toward Figueres and General René Picado.
Though one could argue that the State Department would still have favored Ulate simply because
of Calderón’s association with the PVP, the next section challenges the often-stated assumption
that the United States perceived the Vanguardia as a serious international communist threat.
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The United States’ Appraisal of the PVP
The PVP in 1947, according to State Department documentation, was nothing more than
a tightly knit national organization that followed its own version of communism and had no
direct ties to Moscow.63 Though at times the embassy under Donnelly observed that the party
was well organized, the middle-ranking State Department officials only investigated the matter
when the communist organization threatened to cross national boundaries. Moreover, State
Department and CIA reports defined communism in Latin America as “local” in nature, and
communists did not yet pose a serious threat to the hemisphere’s security in the eyes of
Washington officials.64
On October 29, 1945, a report entitled “Communism in Costa Rica” was circulated
throughout the Truman Administration, which considered the PVP a militant party and a
potential force to be reckoned with. A year-and-a-half later, W. S. Lester was requested by
Murray M. Wise to critique the report, and he concluded that the argument no longer held water.
“The party is not now militantly communist,” Lester argued, “and appears not likely to be so any
time soon.” He added that the party’s membership was “relatively small” and that the reforms
being pushed by the PVP were “not extremely radical in nature.” Furthermore, Lester assured
Murray that the PVP was not “violently anti-United States,” and he concluded that the report was
“slightly alarmist in nature.”65
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Ambassador Johnson supported this claim on March 21, 1947, in explaining the possible
reasons behind the PVP’s creating new party bylaws. Johnson hypothesized three distinct
motivations for the party’s actions. First, he reasoned that “because of hemispheric thinking” the
PVP wanted to “eliminate any semblance of a link” to Moscow. Second, Johnson suggested that
Soviet communism “is again finding it necessary to take action similar to the dissolution of the
Comintern,” which would effectively eliminate Moscow’s connection to the communist party in
Costa Rica. Third, it was likely, according to Johnson, that Calderón’s distancing himself from
the party and other “local circumstances” might have forced the PVP to “clean its skirts of any
connections...with Moscow which may now exist.” His third hypothesis seems to be more likely,
since the PRN and the PVP officially disavowed “the existence of any pact or agreement…or for
cooperation in the coming elections.”66 Whatever the reason, the U.S. Ambassador believed that
the modifications in the PVP’s statutes meant that it probably had no connections to Moscow.67
Moreover, on April 11, Johnson observed a demonstration held by the PVP on the
anniversary of William Walker’s defeat, in which the Vanguardia made speeches “antagonistic”
to the recent U.S. policy in Greece and Turkey.68 However, the U.S. Ambassador noted that there
was a general “lack [of] enthusiasm” among the protesters. Supposedly in reaction to the antiU.S. demonstration, another group of protesters gathered, waving American flags and
denouncing communism in Latin America. Johnson, though, was skeptical of their motives, as
the parade ended in front of the building of the opposition’s newspaper, Diario de Costa Rica.
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The Ambassador commented that the demonstration “resulted not so much from any real
sympathy for our country but rather from purely local and domestic politics.” In fact, Johnson
requested the Department’s guidance in the future for intimating both to the opposition and the
government that the embassy “cannot permit the [United States’] Flag to be used for any political
purposes.” For the time being, though, the U.S. Ambassador believed that such a protest would
“serve no useful purpose…since the superficial intent of the demonstration was to support the
United States.”69 Still, Johnson was not easily moved by the opposition’s anti-communist and
pro-U.S. rhetoric.
However, Costa Rica was certainly not immune to communist penetration in the eyes of
the embassy. On April 24, Johnson described to Washington the critical economic situation
developing in Costa Rica that could potentially serve as a fertile breeding ground for
international communism. He noted that “the majority of the wealth…is held in a few hands” and
“that the situation is a basic reason for possible Communist penetration.” He believed the
situation warranted more leniency by the United States’ toward Costa Rica concerning
repayment loans in order to “avoid complete bankruptcy of the Government.” Consistent with
the United States’ economic self-help approach toward Latin America, Johnson also suggested
that the “Costa Ricans must be taught that the United States is not Santa Claus” and that they
needed first to “put their house in order.”70
Washington at the end of April also began hearing rumors that the PVP might be linked
to communists in Cuba, thus suggesting that international communism might presently be
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lurking in the hemisphere. Bennett made a note of this on April 28 when an anonymous source
indicated that “top leaders” of the PVP received instructions from Cuba, which had “typical
Communist jargon…of American political and economic ‘imperialism.’” Still, the report lacked
“some communication going the other way,” which the State Department started looking for
immediately thereafter but evidently never found.71
Moreover, W. S. Lester of the Division of America Republic Affairs wrote to Bennett on
May 7 expressing his concerns about a tighter connection between the PVP and Moscow. Lester
argued that “the Vanguardia, despite its apparent intent to appear less communistic, has been
evidencing a more essentially Communistic character than it has heretofore under its present
name.” Part of his logic was that Archbishop Victor Manuel Sanabria Martínez, who in previous
communications with Ambassador Johnson conveyed his belief that the PVP “does not follow
‘Marxist’ theories or instructions from Moscow,” had “noticeably cooled in his attitude toward
the organization.” Although Lester reasoned that the PVP was becoming more communistic, he
noted that the “cooling” of Sanabria’s attitude “will tend to weaken the Party.”72
When Walter J. Donnelly stepped in as Ambassador on June 27, he started speculating
that the bombing campaigns, which had begun in 1946 and had been perpetuated by the
opposition in order to create instability in Costa Rica, might be linked to the weakened PVP, who
he claimed could be “creating fear on both sides” so that “the administration would call on the
support of the Vanguardia.” That way the PVP “would have a high bargaining power with the
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opposition.”73 However, the PVP maintained a relatively low position on the United States’ list
of threats in Latin America, and it was largely ignored for the rest of the summer.
This may be explained by the Central Intelligence Agency’s “Review of the World
Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,” published on September 26, which
assessed the communist threat in Latin America. In short, the report stated that Latin American
“local Communists, isolated from direct Soviet support and operating within the power orbit of
the United States, cannot seize and hold political control.” For this reason, according to the
report, the USSR “pursues limited objectives in that area.” Moreover, in its summary, the CIA
reported that the Soviet Union “is presently incapable of military aggression outside of Europe
and Asia,” and in the CIA’s list of priority areas to protect from Soviet influence, Latin America
was absent.74
Donnelly made a similar assessment of the communist situation in Costa Rica on October
9. In it he stated that the PVP’s leader, Manuel Mora, was “not a militant communist” but was
“intelligent, honest, with a carefully balanced program.” Concerning the question on whose side
Mora and the PVP would take in an armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the United
States, Donnelly reported that Mora most likely “would accept the judgement of the Government
and the people,” though he “would not actively support the Government” if it allied itself with
the United States. The U.S. Ambassador further noted that overall, “the position of the United
States [in Costa Rica] will in all probability continue favorable.” Though Donnelly in another
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report on the same day considered the PVP “one of the best-organized Communist groups in
Latin America,” neither he nor the CIA perceived the local communist party to have direct ties to
Moscow.75
Two days after Donnelly’s departure on October 15, Vice Consul Cohen noted that the
opposition used the reestablishment of the Communist International in Moscow as political
capital to charge Calderón of allying himself with “local communists.”76 Though Carrigan on
October 30 expressed his belief that the communist strength in Costa Rica “as an international
factor is on the increase and must not be taken lightly,” his opinion largely went unnoticed,
except for Bennett’s commenting that the Department would investigate the matter of the
Guatemalan and Venezuelan presidents reportedly being indoctrinated by Costa Rican
communist Carmen Lyra. On November 20, Bennett was informed that “no definite information”
indicated a link between Arévalo and Carmen Lyra and that “nothing whatsoever” indicated
Betancourt’s association with Lyra.77 Because it appeared to remain inside Costa Rica’s borders,
the PVP remained a relatively small threat to the United States.
On December 17, the CIA published another “Review of the World Situation,” which this
time discussed the increase in anti-communist activity in Latin America. Based on the anticommunist actions of the overwhelming majority of the American states, the CIA concluded that
the United States could now expect “extensive support” from the American republics “on issues
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with respect to the USSR.” However, the CIA also noted that the “increase in anti-communist
activity…stems in part from a desire to win favor and possible financial assistance from the US.”
The CIA concluded the report by assuring Truman that the USSR “now probably believes both
that its efforts to counterbalance US influence in Argentina have failed and that Argentina (and
the rest of Latin America) is firmly committed to a pro-US orientation.”78
At the year’s conclusion, the higher ups in the Truman Administration across the board
believed that the American republics wholly supported the United States, and the PVP virtually
did not exist in the minds of Acheson, Lovett, and Marshall – all of whom had been actively
involved in building the U.S. hemispheric defense plan in the immediate aftermath of World War
II. If any evidence exists that may reveal legitimate apprehension of Latin American communism
originating from State Department top officials in 1947, I have missed it.
Ultimately, this section suggests that Washington permitted the existence of local
communism as long as it remained inside its country’s borders. Moreover, the evidence in this
chapter has shown that the anti-communist, pro-U.S. propaganda espoused by the Costa Rican
opposition failed to impress State Department and the CIA officials, who suspected that these
actions were taken merely to obtain either political or economic support from the United States.
Communism in Latin America, particularly in Costa Rica, did not yet constitute a serious enough
threat to warrant intervention.
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Conclusion
In 1947 the U.S. embassy was more concerned with the growing feud between the
opposition and the PRN than it was with eradicating the PVP. The embassy did not attempt in
any way to pressure the Costa Rican government to proscribe the PVP, and Washington officials
certainly did not preoccupy themselves with local matters in Costa Rica. Thus, Washington
entered 1948 with Costa Rica hardly on its mind. Meanwhile, the embassy in San José braced
itself for a tumultuous election in 1948.
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CHAPTER 2
“LOCALIZING” THE COSTA RICAN REVOLUTION OF 1948

From January to April 1948, the unstable political climate in Costa Rica rapidly
deteriorated into a civil war. After Ulate won the popular vote on February 8, Calderón
immediately charged the opposition with fraud and overturned the electoral tribunal’s decision
by appealing to the PRN-dominated congress to annul the elections. The U.S. embassy during
February and March simply watched as the violence unfolded, hoping that the Costa Ricans
could solve the problem themselves. Meanwhile, the officials in Washington walked a fine line
in protesting any interventionist action taken by another American republic in Costa Rican
matters, while simultaneously maintaining its own policy of strict neutrality. On April 19, the
U.S. embassy, in a group effort with the diplomatic corps in Costa Rica, helped bring about
peace negotiations between the rebels and the government, thus ending the conflict. The civil
war was ultimately a victory for the opposition and the United States, the latter being relieved
that the conflict did not spread beyond Costa Rica’s borders.
However, Kyle Longley’s third chapter in The Sparrow and the Hawk, titled “The First
Latin American Battleground of the Cold War: The U.S. Response to the Costa Rican Civil War
of 1948,” argued that the United States clearly intervened on behalf of the revolutionaries to oust
the communist-supported government. Longley noted, for example, that the Area Specialist of
Central America and Panama Affairs, William Tapley Bennett, Jr., by January had become
increasingly apprehensive of the Vanguardia’s position in the Costa Rican government. Yet,
Longley also observed that “Bennett failed to establish adequately any direct relationship
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between the Vanguardia and the Soviet Union.”79 Even if he had determined that such a
connection existed, the evidence presented here indicates that the United States viewed Manuel
Mora and the PVP as fluid opportunists, capable of allying either with the government or the
opposition.80 In other words, removing Picado and the PRN from the government would not have
necessarily solved the communist problem or gotten rid of the PVP, at least from the United
States’ perspective. Allying with the opposition, in this regard, would not have made much
sense.
In addition, Longley suggested that the Director of the Office of European Affairs John
D. Hickerson’s statement – that the crisis in Czechoslovakia in February of 1948 had “scared the
living bejesus out of everybody” – was reflective of U.S. “fears of Soviet expansion in Europe,
Asia, and Latin America” and that it motivated Truman to intervene to suppress communism in
Costa Rica.81 However, Hickerson’s statement by itself is a drastic overgeneralization and
misrepresentation of the State Department’s general opinion of the severity of the communist
threat in Latin America. For example, Bennett remarked during the revolution that comparisons
between Costa Rica and Czechoslovakia were likely “overdrawn.”82 Moreover, the delegates
responsible for crafting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in March 1948 decided that the
“North Atlantic” restriction was necessary in order “to prevent efforts of Latin America,
Australia, etc., to adhere” since they were not “directly threatened by Soviet Communism.” 83
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Longley also suggested that the United States successfully pressured Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador not to give the Picado government weapons.84 Longley cited a
message from the U.S. Chargé in Honduras to Secretary of State George C. Marshall on March
18, 1948, but I discovered that the message did not indicate, in any way, the United States’
pressuring Honduras to withhold material support from Picado. Rather, Tiburcio Carías initiated
the conversation and assured Cohen that he would not give Picado arms.85 Moreover, Longley’s
claim, that “the United States restricted Somoza’s assistance to Picado,” failed to emphasize that
that “assistance” was the Guardia Nacional, which Somoza never tried hiding. Instead, Somoza
openly lobbied for U.S. support of his actions to help Picado defeat the rebels, but the United
States declined and discouraged intervention. Meanwhile, Guatemala only sent arms to the
rebels, and even then, the U.S. embassies in Costa Rica and Guatemala had trouble in
determining whether to blame Arévalo or his military subordinates, who may have been acting
independently and not under the orders of Arévalo. With the Bogotá Conference approaching, it
is likely that the Truman Administration did not want to instigate a conflict with one of its
southern neighbors and, therefore, did not accuse the Guatemalan president of materially
assisting Figueres.
Longley’s most persuasive piece of evidence – that the U.S. military attaché Colonel
James R. Hughes “visited Figueres’ camp several days before the fighting started…making
several recommendations to improve their capabilities” – was dismantled by Olander. Olander
pointed out that Longley mistakenly placed Hughes’ trip in the days prior to the Revolution,
though State Department documentation had him visiting Figueres on March 15. Even then, the
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purpose of his visit was only to investigate reports of U.S. pilots being captured by the rebels.
Olander also noted that Hughes reported to the embassy “a vastly exaggerated figure” of 2,000
rebel soldiers, though Ameringer’s The Democratic Left in Exile, and a good number of other
sources, indicate that there never existed more than an estimated 700 soldiers. For Olander,
Hughes’ drastic miscalculation is indicative that the U.S. military attaché did not have insider’s
information of the rebels’ logistics and planning and, therefore, was not an active player for the
rebels during the civil war.86
Furthermore, Longley cited a paper produced by the National Security Council and the
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff titled, “U.S. Policy Regarding Anti-Communist
Measures Which Could Be Planned and Carried Out within the Inter-American System.” This
paper emphasized that “international communism…is a direct and major threat” to the Western
Hemisphere. However, the document’s authors in the next line stated that they considered the
international communist threat only to be a “potential rather than an immediately serious one in
Latin America,” and suggested that the Truman Administration take “preventative measures” to
“minimize” the threat.87 This did not necessarily mean the violent suppression of communist
parties in Latin America, and as demonstrated here, Washington did not believe that the defeat of
Picado and the PRN meant the end of the PVP and communism in Costa Rica.
Finally, though Longley did not definitively assert that the United States mobilized its
troops in the Canal Zone in order to counteract the communist threat in Costa Rica, he
emphasized that this action, if it ever happened, influenced Picado’s decision to surrender
prematurely.88 Most historians, including Longley, who suggest that the Truman Administration
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mobilized troops in the Canal Zone to force Picado’s surrender, cite Bell’s Crisis in Costa Rica.
However, Bell primarily relied on a 1964 unfootnoted secondary source, Ricardo Fernández
Guardia, Cartilla histórica de Costa Rica, and he cited a grievance pamphlet created by the
Comisión Politica de Vanguardia Popular in Guatemala City in 1949 titled (translated to English)
“Why Democracy Fell in Costa Rica.” This hardly constitutes evidence of U.S. intervention.89
Ultimately, I agree with Olander’s central argument – that the State Department
“consistently adhered to a policy of non-intervention in the Costa Rica civil war and the crucial
events immediately preceding it.”90 The Costa Rican revolution, and its potential to turn into a
regional conflict between dictators and revolutionaries throughout Central America and the
Caribbean, concerned the State Department since it threatened the peace and stability of the
hemisphere. Consistent with its approach in 1947, the U.S. embassy maintained a posture of
strict neutrality. Meanwhile, Washington discouraged other countries from intervening in the
Costa Rican revolution in order to keep it confined to Costa Rica.
This chapter is divided into three sections and makes a chronological argument. The first
section covers the period leading up to the Costa Rican revolution and argues that the United
States remained completely neutral during the Costa Rican presidential elections and did not
respond to the PRN-dominated congress’s annulment of the elections. The second section covers
the beginning of the Revolution and argues that the United States did not intervene in the conflict
and encouraged other American republics to do the same. The last section discusses the end of
the revolution and argues that the quick termination of the Revolution was a success for the
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United States, not because the communist threat had dissipated, but because the local conflict did
not escalate into a regional war.
Bracing for the Revolution
In the opening months of 1948, the U.S. embassy witnessed a rapid deterioration in the
relationship between the PRN-PVP alliance and the opposition. It consistently reported back to
Washington the charges of fraud dealt by both coalitions, which the embassy feared would
inevitably lead to a civil war. Still, with the Bogotá Conference approaching in March, the new
U.S. Ambassador, Nathaniel P. Davis, and his staff maintained a posture of strict neutrality and
denied both the PRN-PVP alliance and the opposition material or moral support.
Shortly before Davis’ arrival to San José on January 31, General Picado in an interview
published by the government’s newspaper, La Prensa, warned the opposition that if it wanted to
“challenge the power of the Government they already know my sole reply: Bullets.” This was in
direct response to the opposition’s attempt to register “ghost parties” for the upcoming elections,
which would make it appear that the opposition had more numerical support than it actually had.
The PRN, in turn, created its own ghost parties, which made a mess for the electoral tribunal to
try to clean up. Ultimately, it was decided by the tribunal that only members of the Unión
Nacional (Ulate’s party), the PRN, and the PVP could serve on the voting boards that oversee the
elections. However, the names of the ghost parties in the voting booths was permitted, which
Vice Consul Cohen believed “will open the way for claims and counter claims of fraud to such
an extent that no one can predict the final outcome.”91
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The creation of the ghost parties subsequently opened outlets for both sides to viciously
attack their enemies without having to claim responsibility for the attacks. Cohen reported in
January that each side hurled “vituperation and personal insults” at each other “under the cloak
of being publications of the ghost parties,” thus permitting the PRN and opposition to “deny
responsibility” and even “apologize for such publications.” For instance, Cohen noted that Ulate
had been labeled as “a terrorist, a drunkard, a person without ability, etc.,” while Calderón had
been called “a thief, a communist, and numerous other vile epithets.” Furthermore, the
opposition began publishing illustrations in its newspapers comparing life in Costa Rica before
and after Calderón’s tenure as president, which Cohen believed to be “an illy [sic] concealed
attempt to instigate class war,” which had up to this point been “within the exclusive province”
of the PVP. The publications were indicative, in the view of the U.S. vice consul, “of the steadily
degenerating tempo of political campaigns in Costa Rica.”92 When the new U.S. Ambassador,
Nathaniel P. Davis, arrived on January 31, 1948, the political situation in Costa Rica was highly
unstable.
On February 10, Davis reported the final numbers of the 1948 presidential election –
Ulate – 47,487; Calderón – 37,194. Davis, still fresh in his role as U.S. Ambassador, could not
fully appreciate the significance of Ulate, the underdog, achieving a victory over the PRN,
though the rest of the embassy optimistically believed that this might be for the best. It should be
recalled that throughout 1947 the embassy reported that a victory by Calderón would likely result
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in a revolutionary and violent reaction by the opposition. With this upset, there was some hope
that a civil war might be avoided.93
However, this optimism quickly disappeared when Calderón cried fraud.94 Though he
claimed that a “hundred thousand” voters were prevented from casting ballots, Davis believed
that the final number from the polls “destroys” Calderón’s charge and that the “number of
Calderonistas unable to vote is apparently fairly well balanced by the number of Ulatistas unable
to do so.” Still, the PRN and the PVP refused to stand down. Though Manuel Mora and the PVP
“solemnly promised the country to accept the election results,” the party decided that the “fraud
committed by the Electoral Register,” preventing the votes of “tens of thousands,” justified its
refusal to accept the results.95 The election, then, was appealed to the electoral tribunal.96
Rumors also began to emerge that Calderón might go outside of Costa Rica’s borders to
get military assistance. On February 20, the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Maurice M.
Bernbaum, reported to Secretary of State George C. Marshall that “there are increasing reports”
indicating a growing interest by Somoza to intervene on behalf of Calderón. Supposedly, in a
message given to Bernbaum, it was rumored that “some 200 Guardia Nacional” were observed
proceeding to the Costa Rican border, “armed with a considerable number of sub-machine guns.”
However, the Ambassador ultimately concluded that intervention by Somoza was unlikely since
the “announcement in the local press” of the United States’ interest in a “peaceful solution of the
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Costa Rican election” had made the Guardia Director second-guess any interventionist action.97
Still, the slightest threat of an international conflict breaking out in Central America generated
some concern in the State Department.
Nearing March, the political tensions between the parties morphed into unpredictable
chaos. Davis reported on February 25 that stores had been boarded up and that business was
“quite stagnant” due to the strained political situation. Calderón and Ulate both indicated their
unwillingness to accept the decision by the electoral tribunal if unfavorable, and Ulate threatened
Calderón with a “revolutionary strike” if the election results were overturned. Meanwhile
Calderón promised to have the electoral tribunal’s decision nullified by congress if Ulate stood
as the winner. On February 28, the electoral tribunal voted in favor of Ulate, and Calderón, as
promised, took the matter to congress, which nullified the elections in a vote of 27 to 19.98
Immediately, the Costa Rican government appealed to Davis to support Picado in
suppressing the outraged opposition.99 Davis emphasized the United States’ policy of
nonintervention, reiterating that his “sole motive” was to help the Costa Rican government in its
effort to “avoid bloodshed.” On the other hand, Ulate wrote directly to President Truman to try to
goad him into intervening on behalf of the opposition by reporting that U.S. arms in the hands of
the communist party “are being used to kill Costa Ricans.” Private U.S. citizens even tried
pressuring the Truman Administration into intervening on behalf of the opposition to overthrow
the communist-backed government. Orion Solera, a self-identified ex-American sailor living in
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Costa Rica, complained to Davis that his request to the Costa Rican government to protect U.S.
property prevented Figueres from taking tractors that belonged to the Pan American Highway,
which in turn interfered “in the fight against communism.” Additionally, Hamilton Vonbreton, a
resident of Los Angeles, wrote to Democratic U.S. Senator Sheridan Downey, of California, that
unless “cooperative action” between the United States and other Latin American countries takes
place very shortly, there will be a “full fledged communist country…one hundred miles north of
the Panama Canal.”100
However, the United States did not budge on its policy of strict neutrality. When Senator
Downey referred Vonbreton’s letter to the State Department, the Counselor of the Secretary of
State, Charles E. Bohlen, responded that the initial statement in the letter (“a communist
controlled government has illegally placed itself in office in Costa Rica”) contained “certain
inaccuracies,” but that the State Department shared his concern over the “state of unrest” and
was “observing the situation closely.” While the State Department discounted the idea that the
communist-supported government “illegally” placed itself in office, Secretary Marshall wrote the
embassy on March 12 to say that Davis, in his discretion, should inform President Picado that the
United States hopes that the problem may be solved within “traditional constitutional processes.”
Marshall finished by instructing Davis to keep the conversation “entirely informal” and to
approach Picado as a representative of “a friendly power.” Marshall also asked Davis to evaluate
the communist threat in Costa Rica, but the U.S. embassy became distracted after “an uprising of
real importance had occurred in San Isidro” on March 12. Calderón and the PVP maintained that
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Figueres started the revolt “to bring about intervention by the United States.”101 Whatever the
reason for Figueres’ actions, the United States did not intervene, and the Revolution began
without U.S. involvement.
Localizing the Revolution
As soon as the Revolution started, rumors buzzed in the embassy that each side was
receiving foreign aid. Davis reported this back to Marshall, who in turn ordered diplomatic
representatives in Latin America to inform their respective governments that the Truman
Administration denounced any action taken by any of the republics that could constitute
intervention in Costa Rican affairs. The United States, leading by example, also maintained a
position of strict neutrality and nonintervention.
On March 15, the embassy received a report from President Picado that “rifles with partly
obliterated Guatemalan coats of arms” destined for Figueres had been confiscated by the Costa
Rican government. However, upon examination of the weapons, the embassy informed
Washington that the weapons “did not disclose such markings.” The same day, the military
attaché reported to Davis that he observed “Costa Rican pilots flying the two [Transportes
Aereos Centro Americanos] planes” to transport arms from Guatemala and Panama to Figueres.
Additionally, the attaché estimated that “about a dozen Guatemalan officers or cadets” had
joined the rebels’ ranks and had brought with them weapons that had the “rubber seal of [the]
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Guatemalan military school.”102 Meanwhile, Somoza messaged the embassy in Nicaragua that he
intended to assist the militarily weak Picado regime in shutting down the opposition’s
revolution.103 Secretary Marshall ordered Bernbaum to informally remind the director of the
Guardia Nacional that the United States discouraged intervention and to advise the Guardia
Director to “refrain from intervening.”104
The communist question reemerged on March 16, when William Tapley Bennett, Jr.
received a message from Republican U.S. Senator of Indiana Homer E. Capehart’s office, who
had heard rumors of communists being “in control of the Costa Rican Government” and that
“communists had seized an airfield near San José.” Though the Senator expressed some concern
that the revolution in Costa Rica could have “some sort of international complications in light of
recent happenings in Europe,” Bennett assured him that while “communists were supporting the
Government,” the legality of the current administration should not be under question. Bennett
further stated that “the Department had received no news of communists having seized an
airport.”105
The Department at the time was more concerned with the violence potentially spreading
to other countries and escalating into a regional war. The Ambassador in El Salvador, Albert E.
Nufer, informed the department that the Pan American Airlines radio operator “overheard [a]
radio conversation” indicating that Somoza was moving “about 300 troops by air” to San José.
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Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Edwin J. Kyle messaged the department that the
Costa Rican Minister to Guatemala informed the U.S. naval attaché that Guatemala and
Nicaragua both were “intervening actively” in Costa Rica and that the “present civil war
threatens [to] degenerate into [an] open conflict.” In Costa Rica, Davis discussed the conflict
with Foreign Minister Lara, who pessimistically remarked that “this is the only revolution since
1870” that threatened to spread beyond Costa Rica’s borders. On March 18, the Honduran
Foreign Minister approached the U.S. embassy in Honduras on President Tiburcio Carías’
instructions and assured the embassy that Carías “would not lend material support to the Costa
Rican Administration.” However, Carías expressed his concern that “if the rebels succeed there
with Guatemalan aid,” then Costa Rica could potentially be used “as a base” to launch invasions
against Nicaragua and Honduras. Finally, on March 19, Manuel Mora met with Davis and
informed him of Guatemalan president Arévalo’s “excessive preoccupation with the idea of
Central American Union,” which made it “possible that he had become involved” in Costa Rican
affairs.106
It is also important to note that Davis’ evaluation of Mora and the PVP, requested by
Marshall, did not indicate that there was an international communist presence lurking in Costa
Rica. Instead, Davis reported to Washington that Mora would align himself “with whatever
faction would appear to be in his self-interest,” and that he was a narcissist, an “idealist,” and a
“practical politician.” While Davis and Mora did discuss the general question of international
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communism, the U.S. Ambassador did not draw the conclusion that the PVP had ties with
Moscow. Ultimately, Mora was only a political opportunist who would support the party that in
turn supported the PVP, whether that be the opposition or the PRN. Moreover, in response to
Cohen’s claim that the situation in Costa Rica “is in many respects similar to that prevailing
today in Eastern Europe,” Bennett stated that that “estimate may be a bit overdrawn.” Still, he
recommended that the situation should be closely monitored, in consideration of Peruvian
politician Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre’s describing Costa Rica as “the Czechoslovakia of the
Western Hemisphere.”107
The United States, then, kept its focus on isolating the revolution. Director of the Office
of American Republic Affairs, Paul C. Daniels, met with Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United
States, Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, to respond to the various rumors of armed Nicaraguans coming
to the aid of the Picado government.108 He told the Ambassador that it would be “most
unfortunate” if the dispute now confined to Costa Rica “were to spread over the border of that
country and involve other Central American states.” Similarly, the Acting Secretary of State,
Willard L. Thorp, stressed to the U.S. embassy in Guatemala his concern over “reports indicating
official Guatemalan arms and ammunition being used in Costa Rica.” He then ordered
Ambassador Kyle to solicit a response from Arévalo concerning these rumors.109
Despite Washington’s protests, Guatemala and Nicaragua refused to back down.
Bernbaum reported that Somoza, on March 18, observed a plane taking off from San Isidro for
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Guatemala allegedly intending to “return with fighter planes and larger planes to bomb San
José.” Somoza, in response, ordered his air force to be on “constant patrol” with the orders “to
shoot down any ‘pirate’ plane crossing Nicaraguan territory.” Bernbaum also heard rumors that
Somoza planned to deploy “1,000 fully equipped guardia” to the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican
border.110
On March 20 Somoza, in the Nicaraguan press, denounced Arévalo’s alleged support of
Figueres, and he emphasized that Guatemala’s support of the rebels was part of Arévalo’s larger
plan “to establish a Central American Union,” by overthrowing the governments in Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. Bernbaum believed that this statement was mostly an
appeal to the other American governments to support Somoza’s intervention in Costa Rica in
order to neutralize the revolutionary threat. This effort failed to gain approval from Washington
or the other American republics, but the United States and Costa Rica queried the Guatemalan
government concerning these rumors. The response consisted “only of denial of all facts.”111
On March 21, Davis still hoped that the situation could be resolved in a peaceful
compromise between the rebel forces and the government. Davis observed that while it was
estimated that Figueres maintained a “strong military position,” he felt that “psychological and
political factors involved [were] perhaps equally controlling.” With that said, the U.S.
Ambassador believed that the majority of the Costa Rican population would still accept a
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“reasonable compromise rather than continue armed strife and economic stagnation.”112 This was
only possible, though, if the other American republics stayed out of Costa Rica’s affairs.
On March 22, after Somoza informed the embassy in Managua that he planned to “send
by air 1000 troops of Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional to San José,” Marshall ordered all U.S.
Embassies in Latin America to express to the governments to which they were accredited that the
United States condemned such action. Additionally, Marshall informed his subordinates that the
State Department had already protested Arévalo’s material assistance to the rebels and that the
Guatemalan government had, thereafter, denied all allegations of its involvement in Costa Rica’s
civil war.113
Though it has been argued that the embassy and the State Department had a pretty good
idea that Arévalo was supporting the opposition, an open statement of distrust toward the
Guatemalan government on the eve of the Bogotá conference would have presented a problem
for the U.S. delegation in keeping up appearances of peaceful collaboration with its southern
neighbors.114 Meanwhile, Somoza’s blatant admission of sending troops to Costa Rica justified
the State Department’s diplomatic posturing against the de facto government. When Sevilla
Sacasa confronted the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Robert F.
Woodward, to defend the actions taken by Somoza as a measure to help a friendly government
being attacked by communists, Woodward replied “that such intervention would have an
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inflammatory effect” and that the allegation of communists attacking the Costa Rican
government “was at variance with the reports received by the Department of State.”115
On the other hand, the Department also reminded the opposition that it still maintained a
posture of strict neutrality. Revolutionaries Mario Gutierrez and Jorge Hazera visited Robert
Newbegin and Murray M. Wise of the Division of Central America and Panama Affairs and tried
obtaining “at least moral support” from the State Department for the opposition’s cause.
Newbegin responded that the United States remained entirely neutral and expressed his
“disappointment over the political unrest in Costa Rica,” which in large part was caused by the
rebel forces. Gutiérrez and Hazera, then, fell back on the typical charges made by the opposition
that the communists in Costa Rica “had enough power to be very dangerous” and that the
opposition needed outside help “to rid Costa Rica of this evil.” Realizing that they were fighting
a lost cause, the two gentlemen informed Newbegin and Wise that they would then “approach
the chief of the Chilean delegation” in New York because “he would lend a sympathetic ear to
the cause of Costa Rica.” Wise noted that throughout the entire conversation, the visitors
“approached the problem with a dispassionate attitude,” and they appeared “to understand very
well the Department’s policy of non-intervention in these matters.” The United States at the
height of the civil war, thus, made it abundantly clear that it would resist intervention, despite
both the government’s and the opposition’s numerous requests for U.S. support.116
Two days later, on March 24, Marshall received a report with positive news that Somoza
ordered Sevilla Sacasa to Managua to discuss the possibility of foregoing military aid to Costa
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Rica and to assist Picado in working out a “peaceful compromise” to resolve the “local
problem.” Still skeptical of Sevilla Sacasa’s motives, though, Marshall wired the U.S. embassy
and informed Bernbaum that while the Department was “anxious” for a prompt settlement in
Costa Rica, the chargé should relay to Somoza that Washington “does not support any specific
solution,” thus discrediting any statement Sevilla Sacasa might make concerning “U.S. approval”
of his plan.117
A little less than a week later, the Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation,
Jack D. Neal, had a conversation with the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States, Ismaél
González Arévalo, who again denied accusations that the Guatemalan government was in any
way involved in the Costa Rican matter. Though González Arévalo expressed his concern that
“extension of Nicaraguan aid might well result in the feeling of certain other countries…to take
some steps to counteract Nicaragua,” he assured Neal that the serial numbers on the Guatemalan
arms found in Costa Rica could not be traced back to Guatemala and that “a legend on a case
was meaningless in itself.” However, the U.S. embassy in Mexico still received reports that
various members of the opposition looked to Guatemala for material support.118
Meanwhile, in Costa Rica, Davis became extremely annoyed with the opposition’s
insistence on trying to involve him in the Costa Rican dispute. On April 1, the frustrated
Ambassador wrote to Marshall:
It is surprising to note how many otherwise perfectly sound
citizens simply cannot believe or understand that the United States
is bound to a policy of scrupulous impartiality. That we are
carefully avoiding any act, deed or expression which might
117
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possibly be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of
another nation. By [the opposition] we are condemned for our
failure to come to the rescue in a situation which Costa Ricans
themselves have not been able to solve.
Davis further noted that the opposition tried luring him into the conflict by holding the United
States liable for supplying the current communist-backed government with weapons and that
“the very words lend-lease are regarded as a curse.”119
The opposition also sent Davis a memorandum, which criticized his neutral stance in
their current fight against communism. The message emphasized Davis’ short tenure in office
and noted that U.S. citizens who had lived in Costa Rica for “4, 5, or more years” had criticized
Davis’ actions for not supporting the global fight against communism. Davis forwarded the
document to Marshall, commenting that “it is hardly necessary to comment further on the
contents of the memorandum.”120
Additionally, in response to a letter from William Pennington, a private U.S. citizen,
expressing his concern over “the small communistic minority” that pressured the Costa Rican
Congress into overruling the “freely expressed desire of [the] majority” in the presidential
elections, Newbegin wrote:
Our efforts have been directed toward localizing the problem in so
far as possible leaving it to the Costa Ricans themselves to bring
about a solution without intervention by third powers. To that end
we have made informal, oral representations to both the
Nicaraguan and Guatemalan Governments, reminding them of
their commitments under various inter-American agreements to
refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of a sister republic.
We have also brought our action to the attention of the other
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American Republics with the result that certain of them have made
similar representations.121
For Newbegin and the State Department, isolating the revolution by keeping other countries out
of the conflict still held a higher priority than intervening to eradicate the “the small communistic
minority.”
The United States had yet another reason not to intervene. On April 3 Bernbaum
received information that a perceived “attack of Communists” on the U.S. embassy in San José
was intended to provoke U.S. intervention in Costa Rica “in order to provide the Soviet Union
with justification for its intervention in Europe.” Furthermore, although Bernbaum saw through
the Nicaraguan press’s attempts to connect the communist activity in Costa Rica to Figueres in
order to justify Somoza’s intervention, such an alliance was not improbable for Davis. On April
3 Davis noted that “since a Calderon victory is now out of the question,” it was very possible that
“the old Vanguardia-Republicano voting alliance will be replaced by a Vanguardia-Union
Nacional combination.” He further remarked that Mora, an opportunist seeking to “preserve
himself and his party,” had been “participating in discussions seeking a generally acceptable
solution” to the Costa Rican revolution and would potentially enter an agreement with Ulate in
exchange for the “safeguarding of existing social legislation..”122
With rumors emerging of the Soviet Union watching the United States’ actions in Latin
America and of the PVP’s potentially switching sides, there was good reason that the U.S.
embassy in San José remained a cautious observer and let the Costa Ricans handle their own
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problems. Now that Calderón’s defeat seemed inevitable, Davis and the State Department
anxiously waited for the local violence in Costa Rica to die down.
Ending the Revolution
In the final days of the revolution, the Picado Administration blamed the United States
for preventing the transfer of arms to the Costa Rican government while unsuccessfully keeping
Guatemalan weapons out of Figueres’ hands. The State Department vehemently denied these
accusations of intervention and continued preaching nonintervention both to Guatemala and
Nicaragua. Meanwhile, in Costa Rica, the diplomatic corps helped the government and the
opposition find a peaceful solution to bring a quick end to, and successfully isolate, the Costa
Rican conflict.
On April 6, a hopeless Alvaro Bonilla Lara, Acting Foreign Minister of Costa Rica,
visited Davis to express his disappointment in the Department’s blocking of Nicaraguan arms
going to the Picado government, though “Figueres got ‘tons’ [of] arms munitions from
Guatemala.” Bonilla cited Calderón’s expulsion of the Germans during World War II, reminding
Davis of Calderón’s and Picado’s compliance with U.S. aims since 1940. Davis, as he had with
the opposition, did not fall for these antics used by the government to try to gain U.S. sympathy,
and he reminded the Foreign Minister that the United States’ sole objective was to remain neutral
and to “localize conflicts” by discouraging other countries from intervening. Acting Secretary
Lovett also informed Davis that he could bring to the attention of the Foreign Minister telegrams
sent to Nicaragua and Guatemala, requesting both governments to stay out of Costa Rica’s
affairs. Lovett added that he regretted that the United States’ action, which had been guided by
the desire “to localize [a] purely Costa Rican domestic situation” and “to avoid Costa Rica
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becoming a scene of conflict of opposing outside interests,” had been misinterpreted as being
“unfriendly” to the Picado government.123
Picado also tried blaming the uninterrupted flow of arms to the rebels from Mexico and
Guatemala for his defeat, but the United States was aware that he, too, likely received arms
clandestinely from sources outside of Costa Rica’s borders. In a meeting with the diplomatic
representatives in San José on April 7, Picado displayed several cases of rifles and ammunition
that “bore a legend stating that they were from the Guatemalan Ministry of Defense, and had
been manufactured in the National Munitions Factory of Mexico.” On the same day, however,
the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Walter C. Thurston, reported rumors that René Picado obtained
“approximately one hundred machine guns and necessary ammunition” during his visit to
Mexico. The Ambassador also expressed his concern that U.S. arms shipped to Mexico for
transshipment to Palestine might be “filtering into Central America clandestinely without the
knowledge of the Mexican Government.”124 Regardless of who received the weapons, the United
States expressed its disapproval of the shipment of arms to Costa Rica during the civil war.
On April 13, Costa Rican Ambassador Gutiérrez approached the State Department and
again suggested that the United States’ “action in discouraging intervention in Costa Rica”
worked to Picado’s disadvantage, resulting in the inability of the government in obtaining arms.
Meanwhile, Gutiérrez claimed, the United States’ efforts did not prevent the opposition from
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receiving weapons from Guatemala. Lovett and Newbegin informed the Ambassador that the
United States’ stance of nonintervention “was designed to prevent Costa Rica from becoming a
battle ground” and reminded him that the U.S. government protested intervention both by
Guatemala and Nicaragua. Later that day, Newbegin called Gutiérrez and informed him that a
search of the Department’s files failed to “reveal any instance” in which the Truman
Administration had specifically requested any other state “to refrain from supplying arms to the
Costa Rican Government.” Newbegin, then, emphasized the difference between the proposed
shipment of weapons and “Somoza’s proposal to send a thousand troops into Costa Rica,” and he
added that the only arms the United States attempted to block were the ones being sent from
Guatemala to the opposition. Nicaragua’s assistance “exceeded all reasonable bounds when
Somoza dispatched troops to Costa Rica.”125
After Gutiérrez’s visit, the State Department became extremely cautious in its dealings
with Costa Rica. In response to Davis’ request to bring about a compromise between the
opposition and the government, Acting Secretary Lovett informed the Ambassador that the
proactive extension of his good offices to bring an end to the conflict would inevitably “be
subject to misinterpretation as intervention and that it should therefore be avoided.” However,
Davis could still be involved in “any group diplomatic corps action that seems to hold forth
humanitarian possibility.” On the morning of April 13, Davis, with his other diplomatic
colleagues, met with Figueres to bring about peaceful negotiations.126
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Lovett on April 14 wrote to Daniels in Bogotá to keep him updated on the Costa Rican
situation. The Acting Secretary justified the State Department’s actions since Daniels’ departure
in March, claiming that it had maintained a strictly neutral stance throughout the entire conflict.
The preventative measures taken against Guatemala and Nicaragua were justifiable, according to
Lovett, because Nicaragua threatened to deploy armed forces and because Guatemala’s shipping
of weapons to the opposition was in violation of the Havana Treaty of 1928. Finally, Lovett
ensured Daniels that the Department never blocked any shipment of arms to the Picado
regime.127
Meanwhile, peace talks between Figueres and Picado continued throughout the week
without gaining much headway. Ambassador Gutiérrez, realizing that the situation was hopeless
for Calderón and Picado, visited Newbegin’s office and urged the State Department to take more
affirmative action to quickly bring peace to Costa Rica. Newbegin simply replied that Davis
“had been doing all that was proper.” The United States was certainly eager to bring an end to
the conflict but was also careful not to show partiality toward Figueres, who refused to enter into
a compromise with Picado.128 It is also not plausible that the United States would have helped
Figueres secure a quick victory in order to get rid of the PVP. Cohen observed that Figueres
during the week had issued statements with phrases in it, such as “war against poverty” and “a
country without misery” that were “virtually identical” to those which the “Vanguardia Popular
has maintained for a long time” and that “both Figueres and Vanguardia have certain definite
aims in common.” While the Truman Administration did not consider the PVP a serious threat,
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Cohen’s report indicated that the end of Picado did not mean the end of the PVP. On the other
hand, the United States was careful not to show partiality toward the government. Picado
requested to evacuate Costa Rica via U.S. aircraft, but Lovett decided this was ill-advised and
informed Davis that asylum within the U.S. embassy was prohibited unless the person’s life was
in immediate danger.129 Thus, the State Department did not want to appear to take sides by
supporting a potential PVP-Figueres alliance or by granting asylum to Picado. It only wanted the
Costa Ricans to reach an agreement by themselves before another state intervened.
On April 17 Davis received more news that Somoza planned to invade Costa Rica, and he
worried that Nicaragua’s intervention would disrupt the progress made between the opposition
and the government to bring about peace.130 The Ambassador and the diplomatic commission in
Costa Rica desired that “all American countries obtain complete cessation of Nicaraguan
intervention in the Costa Rican revolution” and believed that the most effective means of
accomplishing this would be through “the authority of the Bogota conference.” Lovett relayed
Davis’ message to the embassy in Bogotá, suggesting that multilateral action at the conference
should be made to prevent a “potential international conflict.” Lovett the next day warned Davis
that if the warring factions failed to reach a settlement soon, then it was very likely that Somoza
might join ranks with Picado and that Arévalo might join ranks with Figueres. Fortunately, for
the State Department, Figueres and Picado reached an agreement on April 19. Picado stepped
down as president, and all military action came to a halt. Davis, the next day, received a message
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of commendation from Lovett, expressing his gratitude for his “role in facilitating the reaching
of agreements between Figueres and Picado.”131
Conclusion
The United States eventually achieved its goal in isolating the Costa Rican Revolution
without being charged with intervention by the American republics. Davis consistently
encouraged peaceful negotiations between Figueres and Picado within Costa Rica, while the
State Department discouraged intervention by Guatemala and Nicaragua. Historian Steven
Schwartzberg and I have found no direct evidence indicating that Davis, the U.S. embassy, or
Washington ever wanted the PRN or the PVP to be defeated by force of arms.132 And while I
also agree with Longley’s claim that the United States took a firmer approach toward Somoza
than it did toward Arévalo (only because Somoza mobilized his military), the assumption that the
United States knew that Arévalo shipped arms to the opposition does not hold water. U.S.
Ambassador Milton K. Wells, on April 13, wrote:
However, thernow [sic] appears some reason to believe that
President AREVALO may not, after all, be responsible; and that
such assistance as is now reaching FIGUERES is being arranged
for directly by the Army, whose leaders (Colonel ARANA, Major
ARBENZ and Major COSENZA) are more apprehensive over the
possibility of [a] communist-dominated Government in Costa Rica
than over hostile regimes in Honduras and Nicaragua.133

131

Davis to Marshall, “The Ambassador to Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” April 17, 1948, NARA, RG 59,
818.00/4-1748; Lovett, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Bogotá,” April 17, 1948, NARA, RG 59,
818.00/4-1748; Lovett, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Costa Rica,” April 18, 1948, NARA, RG 59,
818.00/4-1848; Lovett to Davis, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to Costa Rica,” April 20, 1948,
NARA, RG 59, 818.00/4-1448.
132
Schwartzberg, Democracy and U.S. Policy, 184.
133
Milton K. Wells to Marshall, “Guatemalan Assistance to Revolutionary Movement in Costa Rica,” April 13, 1948,
NARA, RG 59, 818.00/4-1348.

67

The bottom line is that the Truman Administration, while certain that the arms sent to Costa Rica
came from Mexico and Guatemala, did not know who exactly to blame. Meanwhile, Somoza
made his position abundantly clear in the hopes that the Truman Administration and other
American republics would support his interventionist actions.
The United States succeeded in helping isolate the Costa Rican Revolution. Communism
and the PVP in Costa Rica were closely monitored, but they never posed a serious enough threat
for the United States to intervene to support Figueres. Even if the PVP had been considered a
serious enough threat, the U.S. embassy believed that it would potentially ally with the
opposition in the case of a Figueres victory. Thus, removing the PRN from the government
would not have eliminated the PVP from the embassy’s perspective. The Truman
Administration, therefore, sought only to keep the conflict within Costa Rica’s borders while
simultaneously discouraging intervention by the other American republics.
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CHAPTER 3
PROMOTING PEACEFUL COLLABORATION: THE UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO
THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA CRISIS OF 1948-1949

The end of the Revolution did not bring about regional peace. After the opposition took
over, Figueres and Ulate signed a pact that gave Figueres and an eleven-man junta the power to
rule by decree for eighteen months. Ulate would, thereafter, take over as the first president of the
Second Republic of Costa Rica.134 Figueres still held onto the Caribbean Legion, which the
Truman Administration understood to be the principal factor in the opposition’s victory. The
Legion now looked to overthrow Somoza. Meanwhile, in Nicaragua, Calderón began organizing
a counterrevolutionary military consisting of exiled Calderonistas trained and supported by
Somoza’s Guardia Nacional. Furthermore, the PVP now constituted a threat to regional peace
since it was the only formidable opponent of Figueres that could potentially force him out of
office, which the State Department feared would lead to more instability. Ultimately, the volatile
relationships among Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the three groups of revolutionaries deteriorated
into the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis of 1948-1949. The Truman Administration’s work in
bringing about peace in Central America was hardly over.
This chapter is divided into five sections to make the argument that the Truman
Administration promoted peaceful collaboration between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and helped
isolate the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis by working with the Organization of American States
(OAS) to eliminate revolutionary activity in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The first section
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discusses the multiple rejections by the United States of Costa Rica’s requests for arms. I
highlight these conversations to emphasize that the Truman Administration did not materially
assist Figueres to violently suppress the PVP and, instead, refrained from giving him weapons
since they might be used against Somoza. The next three sections compare the United States’
relationships, respectively, with the PVP, the Calderonistas, and the Caribbean Legion in the
latter half of 1948. Each group, regardless of its ideology, now posed a threat to regional peace,
and the United States took positive steps toward – or at least did not intervene to stop – the
elimination of these forces. The final section discusses the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis and the
Truman Administration’s role in bringing a quick end to the conflict.
The Arms Question
From May to December of 1948, Figueres, on numerous occasions, requested arms from
the United States, which for various reasons were denied each time. Of principal concern to the
United States was the Caribbean Legion’s presence in Costa Rica, and Washington feared that
any U.S. weapons going to Figueres might be used against Somoza, thus impeding Central
America’s return to peace. Additionally, the junta had inherited an outstanding Lend-Lease
account of roughly $85,000 that still needed to be paid. Meanwhile, Costa Rica underwent an
economic crisis, due in part to the recent Revolution, and Washington did not want to place a
financial burden on the junta by giving it expensive weapons. Finally, the United States could
not give Costa Rica, and Latin America in general, “cheap” weapons since it had sold all its
surplus material to countries outside Latin America. Latin American militaries, especially Costa
Rica’s, were a low priority in Truman’s larger Cold War strategies. Since the arming of Costa
Rica would be an impediment toward peace, and since its military could not contribute much to
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the fight against international communism, the United States during the latter half of 1948
refused to sell the junta weapons.
On May 11, the Chief of the United States Military to Costa Rica, Colonel Edwin
Messinger, discussed with Ambassador Davis the prospects of the United States’ selling arms to
Costa Rica. Davis informed the Colonel that Costa Rica still had “an outstanding account for
previous deliveries” and that he needed from Figueres assurances that no U.S. arms would “be
used in military adventures in other American countries.” Davis also noted that Costa Rica’s
military remained a low priority for the United States’ hemispheric defense plan and, therefore,
concluded “that the Embassy was not prepared at this time to discuss arms questions.” Moreover,
Vice Consul Alex A. Cohen observed that Figueres’ recruiting campaign to increase the size of
the military was publicly criticized by Ulate’s newspaper, which published editorials with titles
such as, “Militarism NO,” and “WE DO NOT WANT AN ARMY.” The United States, having
been accused often by the opposition during the Revolution of supplying Picado and Calderón
with arms through Lend-Lease agreements, decided to avoid giving more arms to an unpopular
and unpredictable army.135
On May 21 the junta announced the disbanding of the revolutionary military, but Cohen
reported a week-and-a-half later that the order did not include members of the “so-called
‘National Army’” now in the process of organization. Davis did notice a change in Figueres’
attitude, though, likely due to the population’s being “profoundly sceptical [sic] of political
promises and anything of military rule.” Ulate led the public fight against the militarization of
Costa Rica, warning that the “tendency of some young veterans of the revolution to strut their
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uniforms may lead to the development of a military caste.” The junta was also dealing with an
economic crisis in the aftermath of the Revolution, and the purchase of weapons to maintain a
large army would only lead to further economic decay.136
In an attempt to convince the United States to forgive the Lend-Lease debt accrued by the
Calderón and Picado regimes, Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States, Mario A. Esquivel,
complained to the State Department that the arms used by the Picado government to suppress the
opposition had come from lend-lease agreements. After Newbegin dismissed this overdrawn
complaint, the Costa Rican Ambassador then asked if the junta “could supply wood and other
building materials rather than make payments in colones.” Newbegin responded that this was not
“a practical arrangement,” thus leaving the junta with an outstanding balance of $84,877.25.137
William Tapley Bennett, Jr., again met with Esquivel in July to discuss a new arms
request sent to the United States by the junta. Bennett informed him that while the State
Department did not oppose the transaction, the difficulties in completing such transactions lied in
the “lack of arms” and the “lack of authority” to declare the leftover U.S. military equipment as
“surplus.” Esquivel replied that he was “sick of the whole armaments mess” anyway and that he
had become discouraged over the militarization of Costa Rica. Bennett then advised the
Ambassador not to look for arms to solve the crisis with Nicaragua but, instead, develop a “spirit
of confidence” with its Central American and Caribbean neighbors. On July 29, Esquivel
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informed the State Department that “he would not be disappointed if the request were turned
down.” Shortly thereafter, it was.138
On August 19, Cohen outlined the junta’s military policies, which up to this point in time
had been very divisive. He noted that the complete reorganization of the army had led to charges
that Figueres “was attempting to militarize the country.” Figueres had significantly increased the
size of the standing army from the traditional figure of roughly 550 officers and men to a much
larger figure of 181 officers and 1,813 enlisted men, though Cohen observed that the army
cannot “be considered unduly large” when compared to Somoza’s Guardia Nacional. Still, the
increased size of the military was criticized by the Costa Rican population who wanted, instead,
to rid itself of a military. Cohen expected that the committee tasked with creating the new
constitution might try “entirely to eliminate the army in Costa Rica.” Cohen finished his report
by stating that any U.S. arms given to Costa Rica during this time “might conceivably be
diverted to international adventures.”139
Ambassador Esquivel, during his visit to Costa Rica in October, approached the U.S.
embassy once more to discuss Costa Rica’s Lend Lease account. Esquivel brought up the
possibility of cancelling the debt, which Davis immediately discouraged. Instead, he informed
the Costa Rican Ambassador that he might be successful in appealing to the officials in
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Washington for Costa Rica to pay in colones, rather than dollars. Still, Esquivel left
disappointed, as he evidently had instructions either to request a cancellation or reduction of the
outstanding debt.140
Thus, Costa Rica went without U.S. arms in the months leading up to the Costa RicaNicaragua Crisis. Washington refused these requests because the junta could not afford the arms,
would likely misuse the arms, and, most importantly, did not need the arms to defend itself from
a Soviet attack.141 The argument has also been made that similar action was taken by the United
States concerning arms sales to Nicaragua in 1948.142 The United States did not expect Latin
American militaries to effectively defend the hemisphere from an overt communist threat, so the
United States, in this regard, did not have had an incentive to give Nicaragua weapons.143
Moreover, the United States had a desire to keep the peace among the American republics, and
Truman refused to give arms to Nicaragua because the weapons likely been would have used
against Figueres.144 Finally, Nicaragua as of August 31, 1948 had an outstanding Lend Lease
debt of $511,760.16, which the Truman Administration took into consideration.145
PVP: A New Threat
Rather than arming Costa Rica and Nicaragua to defend themselves from communism,
the United States, instead, kept a close watch on the three principal revolutionary and
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counterrevolutionary groups in Central America: the PVP, the Calderonistas, and the Caribbean
Legion. Each group, regardless of its ideology, now were threats to the peace and stability of
Central America. Therefore, the United States, while maintaining a policy of strict neutrality
toward all American states, advocated, and sometimes aided in, the elimination of the PVP, the
Calderonistas, and the Caribbean Legion in order to establish Central American peace.
Davis on May 4 said he believed that the PVP now posed a threat in Costa Rica, not
because of its communist ideology but because it “is presently the only organized political force
capable of offering any opposition to the revolutionary government.” However, Cohen did not
seem to be as worried, and ten days later he sent the Department a report indicating that the PVP
and “its parallel labor organization, the [Confederación de Trabajadores de Costa Rica] have
ceased to exist.” Davis disagreed with Cohen’s assessment, though, as he believed that
participation of the PVP in Costa Rica’s political affairs would continue indefinitely. After a
meeting with Father Benjamin Nuñez on May 20, Davis was convinced that the PVP-supported
C.T.C.R. “doubtless continues to a limited extent in certain areas,” despite the Father’s assertion
that the “organization has largely been broken up.”146
The U.S. embassy did observe that public opinion was “forcing the hand of the
government in its attitude of the Vanguardia Popular party.” Vice Consul Cohen reported on
June 10 that the PVP had become increasingly unpopular due “to the many lawless acts of
violence” during the revolution, and there seemed to be “a marked tendency” among the Costa
Rican populace to blame “every outward incident” on the PVP and to “persecute them
accordingly.” Nonetheless, the vice consul noted that the PVP “has prepared for years” for the
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forced exile of principal party leaders and that the persecution of the PVP “is bound to make the
leadership more defiant and more desperate.” Though Davis and Cohen believed that the PVP
had been severely weakened, the embassy worried that an attempt to forcefully outlaw what was
left of the communist party might provoke a counterrevolution, which would threaten regional
peace.147
Still, on July 19, the junta outlawed communism, and subsequently the PVP, and the
embassy braced itself for such a counterrevolution.148 Cohen immediately notified the State
Department of this decision and expressed his concern:
As previously pointed out by the Embassy on a number of
occasions, drastic action on the part of the Junta against
Vanguardia has forced it to go underground. Whether this policy,
in the long run, is preferable to a more lenient one which would
enable the Junta to keep a closer check on Vanguardia’s doings,
can only be told in time. It is significant to note, however, that
there exists a not inconsiderable school of thought that the
repression as now practiced by the Junta, while restraining
Vanguardia from remaining in the open, will not prevent its
continued existence as a much more dangerous clandestine
organization.149
Though the local press, “without exception,” approved of Figueres’ outlawing the PVP, Cohen
was rather apprehensive that the remaining PVP members might react violently.150
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A month later, the first secretary of the U.S. embassy in Guatemala, Milton K. Wells,
reported rumors that Figueres’ anti-communist actions had resulted in exiled PVP leaders’
moving to Guatemala. According to the rumors, Figueres informed Arévalo that he had expelled
members of the PVP, “not because they were communists” but because they “had proved to be
nothing more than incapable grafters.” Still, the Guatemalan president cautioned Figueres against
the blanket exiling of the PVP as a communist organization, since this would draw undue
attention toward Guatemala’s receiving communist exiles.151 It was too late, though, and the
State Department realized that outlawing a communist party in Central America would not
necessarily eliminate it, but would only move it from country to country.
However, after observing the overwhelmingly positive reaction from the Costa Rican
population, Cohen, in August, ultimately commended the junta’s outlawing the PVP. Though the
State Department had no hand in dissolving the communist party in Costa Rica, Cohen believed
that this measure “if enforced…can only result in ultimate benefit to the country as a whole”
since it “meets with the approval of the great bulk of the citizens.” The unification of Costa Rica
meant a less likely chance of another revolution erupting.152 Since the PVP left the country, so
did the only force within Costa Rica that could forcefully oust the government. The State
Department, then, focused on other revolutionary groups in Costa Rica and Nicaragua that
potentially threatened hemispheric peace.
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Somoza and the Calderonistas
In Nicaragua, the U.S. embassy tried to quell a Calderón-Somoza alliance aimed at
ousting Figueres. On April 29, U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Maurice M. Bernbaum, reported
to Washington that Somoza was waging a “war of nerves” against Figueres to keep the unstable
political situation “stirred up” in order to prevent Figueres from aiding or allowing the Caribbean
Legion to invade Nicaragua. Supposedly, an ex-Costa Rican army officer in exile had been
training troops in Managua with Guardia assistance, weapons, and equipment. The following
week, the chargé received news that Calderonistas captured “two truck-loads of arms and
ammunition” that were en route to resupply Figueres’ forces near the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan
border. On June 19, Davis informed Marshall that the junta on the previous night announced the
suspension of individual liberties in response to the threat of counter revolution by the
“Calderonistas and Communists from abroad.”153
On June 19, Newbegin protested to the Nicaraguan Ambassador, Guillermo Sevilla
Sacasa, after receiving reports of Somoza financing and providing other support for the
Calderonista counterrevolutionary army in Managua. The Chief of the Division of Central
America and Panama Affairs explained to Sacasa that he found it “thoroughly undesirable that
action taken by one country outside its own frontiers should be disguised as defense measures.”
If Nicaragua hoped to receive any sympathy from the American republics, regarding Figueres’
assistance to the Caribbean Legion in Costa Rica, then Somoza needed to cooperate with the
United States and get rid of the Calderonistas. That same day, Newbegin made it a point to call
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Esquivel and praise him for Costa Rica’s longstanding tradition of “strictly minding its own
business.” Esquivel assured the Ambassador that the junta would continue this policy, though the
chief of the CPA was aware of the continued presence of the Caribbean Legion in Costa Rica.154
Esquivel on August 10 alleged that Somoza had been training “a substantial number of
Costa Rican exiles” near the border, and that there had recently been “frequent incursions” into
Costa Rican territory. The Ambassador also mentioned “the occasional flights by Nicaraguan
war planes” over Costa Rica and asserted that “General Somoza has a definite intention to invade
Costa Rica.” Meanwhile, Somoza complained about reports from Costa Rica and Guatemala of
revolutionaries in those two countries planning for the invasion of Nicaragua. The new U.S.
chargé in Nicaragua, Halleck L. Rose, after hearing this believed that “Somoza may invade
Costa Rica alleging self-defense.”155
Meanwhile, the State Department tried to prevent the formation of a Carías-SomozaTrujillo alliance to aid the Calderonistas in overthrowing Figueres. On November 26, Marshall
received news that Calderón had traveled to the Dominican Republic allegedly to receive support
from Trujillo, which created enough alarm in Washington to provoke a response from the
Secretary of State. Marshall immediately requested that the embassy in the Dominican Republic
send him any information it might have on Calderón’s visit there.156 I could find no further
documentation on the visit, but it can be assumed that such an international alliance would not be
tolerated by Washington, since, like the Caribbean Legion, this threatened regional peace. Still,
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the most dangerous threat in Central America, from the Truman Administration’s viewpoint, was
the Caribbean Legion.
Figueres and the Caribbean Legion
After the revolution, Figueres still held on to the Caribbean Legion, which was the
deciding factor in the opposition’s victory, and it was well-known in the State Department that
the Legion’s next objective was toppling the Nicaraguan government. Davis heard rumors that
Figueres’ military plans might be “closely related to Arevalo’s international ideological
concepts” of unifying Central America and expressed his regret to Ulate if these rumors were
true since the “direct or indirect” participation by Costa Rica in this endeavor would endanger
Central American and continental peace.157
On May 5, Davis reiterated to Ulate that regardless of whether Somoza was harboring
communist-supported Calderonistas, the United States expected Costa Rica to maintain its policy
of strict nonintervention. The U.S. Ambassador warned the president-elect that a Costa Rican
military venture in Nicaragua’s territory “would quite possibly endanger the peace of Central
America and could quite possibly extend to endangering the peace of the continent.”158
However, Davis was talking to the wrong person.
After the establishment of the Founding Junta of the Second Republic on May 8, Figueres
refused to recognize the Dominican Republic’s government, which contributed even more to the
instability in the Caribbean. “The precipitous nature of the Costa Rican action,” Davis remarked,
“is not dissimilar to the Guatemalan breaking of relations,” and he attributed Figueres’ actions as
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having much to do with Figueres’ commitment to Arévalo. Davis also understood that
Dominican revolutionaries, who were among the members of the Caribbean Legion, “played a
prominent part” in the overthrow of Picado, and he reasoned that “there may be a certain
reluctance on the part of Costa Rica to appear to maintain cordial relations with dictatorships.”159
Figueres’ harboring the Caribbean Legion and the complications that came with that had made
him extremely unpopular among U.S. embassy officials – and the large portion of the Costa
Rican population loyal to Ulate.160
In a speech on May 26, Ulate condemned the military nature of the junta and its rogue
army of revolutionaries. According to Davis, the president-elect had “very positive ideas on three
allied subjects.” First, Ulate cautioned against the development of a military caste. Second, he
claimed that the enthusiasm of the young revolutionaries “may lead to Costa Rican involvement
in military adventures in neighboring countries.” And third, he feared that the harboring and
employment of the Caribbean Legion in “high government offices” may “becloud” Costa Rica’s
friendly relations with her neighbors. Davis applauded Ulate’s anti-military sentiments and held
similar opinions of the revolutionary army. The Ambassador concluded from the speech that:
[I]t would appear that [the Caribbean Legion] may be losing the
initiative…This is not to say that the danger of Costa Rican
involvement in neighboring countries is by any means past, or that
plotting on Costa Rican soil for uprisings in Nicaragua and
Honduras does not continue; but it is at least a hopeful sign that a
man of Mr. Ulate’s prominence and influence should bring these
matters forthrightly before the public, as is the evidence that he
does not stand alone.161

159

Davis to Marshall, “The Ambassador to Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” May 10, 1948, NARA, RG 59,
818.00/5-1048.
160
Longley, Sparrow and the Hawk, 92.
161
Davis to Marshall, “Costa Rican Opposition to Interventionist Plotting,” May 26, 1948, NARA, RG 59, 818.00/52648.

81

Davis, throughout the rest of his tenure in Costa Rica, would consistently support Ulate’s
noninterventionist and anti-militarist messages.
Meanwhile in Washington, Newbegin received a visit from the new Costa Rican
Ambassador to the United States, Mario A. Esquivel, who confirmed his and the junta’s desire,
like that of Arévalo’s, to form a Central American federation. However, Esquivel complained
that dictators posed an obstacle and that “before such a federation could be evolved it was
necessary to eliminate Somoza.” After informing the Costa Rican Ambassador that the United
States did not care whether a Central American federation was formed, Newbegin expressed
Washington’s grave concern over revolutionary groups “who were working in exile to overthrow
the governments of neighboring countries.” Newbegin, then, referred to Washington’s actions
during the Revolution to localize the Revolution and informed Esquivel that this policy still
applied.162
As Costa Rica-Nicaragua relations deteriorated throughout the latter half of 1948,
Washington became very critical of Figueres.163 In his review of the first one hundred days of the
junta, written on August 19, Cohen highlighted the continued existence of the Caribbean Legion
in Costa Rica and criticized Figueres’ assistance to the revolutionaries to overthrow the Carías,
Somoza, and Trujillo dictatorships. However, the vice consul observed that other members of the
junta appeared to be less involved with the Caribbean Legion and wanted it gone altogether,
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since public opinion in Costa Rica traditionally had been “against mixing in the affairs of its
neighbors.”164
On October 13, Bennett received a report from the embassy that Figueres’ current
popularity in Costa Rica was only temporary, as he had just led a “victorious revolution,” and
public support for the junta is “indirectly dependent almost entirely on Ulate’s attitude toward
the regime.” In an apparent attempt to gain favor from the U.S. embassy, Figueres reminded
Davis of the junta’s decision to outlaw communism, to which the Ambassador gave no reply.
Instead, Cohen nine days later remarked that Figueres’ advocacy of “state control over private
property and industry” was indicative of “the socialistic tendency which motivates the junta.”
Furthermore, Davis reported on November 4 that the economic measures taken by Figueres
provoked “public discontent and mistrust.”165
The tensions between Figueres and Somoza intensified on November 12, when Prensa
Libre made the first official mention of the Caribbean Legion’s continued occupation of the
garrisons in San José. According to the article, members of the Legion obstructed the police
investigation of a robbery that occurred in the area of the garrison in which the revolutionaries
were living. Cohen remarked that the significance of the article lay in “the bold-faced admittance
in the press that the cuartel is occupied by the Caribbean Legion.”166 This was alarming for the
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State Department because Nicaragua could now justifiably accuse Costa Rica of plotting against
Nicaraguan President Victor Manuel Román y Reyes with some supporting evidence and,
thereby, justify intervention.
Immediately, Ulate publicly condemned the Legion’s continued presence in Costa Rica.
In the Diario de Costa Rica, he emphasized that the revolution for Costa Rica was over and that
“Central American emigrés…would do us a favor if they would withdraw their hands from Costa
Rican political matters.” La Nacion applauded Ulate’s advocacy for the return to the “Costa
Rican tradition of nonintervention,” which Davis believed to be a hopeful sign that public
opinion would influence Figueres to disband the Legion and forget about Somoza.167
On November 26, a depressed Figueres met with Davis in the U.S. embassy to discuss
various policies of the junta moving forward.168 Davis observed that Figueres was discouraged
due to the junta’s unpopularity both in the United States and Costa Rica, and he looked to the
Ambassador for moral support. The elections for the constituent assembly, which would be
tasked with creating the new constitution, were only two weeks away, and Figueres feared that
his unpopularity impeded his quest to implement certain reforms that he believed were in the
best interest of the country. Concerning the economy, Figueres hoped to negotiate new
concessions with the United Fruit Company in order to help settle some of the country’s debt,
but he feared that even a new agreement with the UFCO “will be subject to criticism” unless he
managed to reach a foreign bondholders’ agreement that would lower the interest rates on
outstanding loans.169
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Davis recognized the opportunity and unhesitatingly rebuked Figueres for his continued
support of the Caribbean Legion, suggesting that it would negatively affect any potential
arrangements made between the junta and foreign bondholders. The conversation went in part as
follows:
Basic to everything is confidence which can best be created by an
intergovernmental agreement, settlement with the bondholders, and
convincing the world that Costa Rica has no war-like
intentions…The President agreed readily as to the necessity for
that. He admitted that so long as the Caribbean Legion is in Costa
Rica, appearances are against him.
Figueres ended the conversation by promising to split the remaining members of the Caribbean
Legion up into “groups of two or three” and to disarm and scatter these small groups throughout
Costa Rica, though Davis withheld his optimism. “Each time he has taken steps to get rid of any
of these people,” the U.S. Ambassador noted, “it has taken months.” The next day Figueres
publicly announced the disbanding of the Caribbean Legion, but more than words were required
for Davis’ applause. The U.S. Ambassador pessimistically wrote to Marshall, “Just what will
happen to the members of the Caribbean Legion remains problematical,” as many revolutionaries
either stayed in San José or traveled in large groups to Guatemala where the PVP also resided.170
The Dissolution of the Costa Rican Army and the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis
Historians still argue the reasons behind Figueres’ disbanding the official standing army
on December 1, 1948. Robert H. Holden suggested that the timing of the junta’s decision to
abolish the military could be explained “by the Junta’s conviction that the Nicaraguan threat had
dissipated” and that Costa Rica could look to the United States for “unilateral protection against

170

Coatsworth, Clients and the Colossus, 63; Longley, Sparrow and the Hawk, 95; Davis to Marshall, “Conversation
with President Figueres,” November 26, 1948, NARA, RG 59, 818.00/11-2648; Davis to Marshall, “The Ambassador
in Costa Rica to the Secretary of State,” November 29, 1948, FRUS, 1948 IX, 536.

85

Panama or Nicaragua.”171 On the other hand, Charles D. Ameringer seemed confused by the
junta’s decision to abolish the army since “the threat of violence persisted.”172 Although the
Costa Rican Foreign Minister, Benjamin Odio, informed Davis on December 1 that he had “no
real fear [of] invasion from Nicaragua,” the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Walter C. Thurston,
noted that the Costa Rican Ambassador there still had “apprehensions [of an] invasion from
Nicaragua.”173 Apparently, the threat of a Calderonista attack still concerned some Costa Rican
officials at the time of the army’s dissolution, but Holden was correct that the United States
would not idly stand by as Nicaragua invaded Costa Rica.174 Moreover, Deborah Yashar,
Annamarie Oliverio, Pat Lauderdale, and Monica Rankin suspected that Figueres disbanded the
military out of fear that it might attempt a coup against the junta.175 However, with much of the
Legion still occupying the garrisons in San José, Figueres was relatively safe from an internal
coup.176
Thus, when Figueres disbanded Costa Rica’s official army on December 1, Truman’s top
officials in Washington did not respond for several possible reasons. First, the army was small
and insignificant, and the U.S. embassy and Washington understood that the Legion had taken its
place in the garrisons in San José. Second, with the PVP mostly exiled, there were no more
counterrevolutionary movements within Costa Rica’s borders that could truly challenge the
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junta’s authority, thus negating the need of a strong military to neutralize counterrevolutionaries
from within the country. And finally, the United States cared more about the existence of the
Legion in Costa Rica than the absence of its official standing army.177 While the dissolution of
Costa Rica’s constitutional army may have been reported as a unique and momentous occasion
in the U.S. press, Truman officials, both in Washington and San José, did not offer
congratulations or pretend to be impressed by Figueres’ actions.178
Furthermore, the dissolution of the army came as no surprise to the U.S. embassy, which
had suspected it would eventually happen, just at a later date. Davis, in a long message to
Marshall titled “The Demilitarization of a Pacifist,” speculated that it was a political stunt:
For some weeks discussions have been going on with officials of
the national museum looking towards the removal of troops from
the Bella Vista cuartel, razing its walls, and transforming the
remaining parts of the structure into a museum…Agreement to
turn over the cuartel was recently reached and the museum
authorities notified the Junta that they would be ready to take
possession and commence demolition of the walls on January 15,
1949. But in its impatience to demonstrate its pacific intentions the
Junta decided to cede the cuartel on December 1, 1948, which was
duly accomplished with much publicity. The fact that this symbolic
act took place six weeks before it need have, but one week before
the election day deadline, is doubtless purely coincidental.
In the same message, Davis noted “that some eighty men of the Legion, with arms sufficient for
considerably more, remain in San José” and that their presence had “not been too reassuring to
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the majority of the populace which would prefer to have none of them.” Laced with a heavy dose
of sarcasm, Davis finished his message describing the superficiality of the military’s dissolution:
Thus everybody should be happy; including the disbanded army,
which retains its organization and continues to report to the same
Minister of Public Security; and the abolished Legion, which
continues to enjoy the companionship of barracks life in the center
of the city. Mention might also be made of the American Military
mission which, with no army to train, should now have ample time
to enjoy the amenities of life in the land of eternal Spring.179
The U.S. embassy clearly was not amused, and I have found no evidence of mid- to high level
officials in Washington even caring to respond to the army’s disbandment.
However, a solution to the Costa Rica-Nicaragua problem seemed to have arisen the day
after the army’s dissolution. During a conversation among the Costa Rican, Nicaraguan, and U.S.
ambassadors in Mexico City, the Costa Rican ambassador expressed Figueres’ discontent with
the continued presence of the Legion in San José, but he feared that “it might turn against
[Figueres]” and kill him if he tried forcing its removal. The Nicaraguan ambassador, after this
conversation, likely understood that more than mere persuasion would be required to force the
Legion’s removal. Sevilla Sacasa then conferred with Mexican President Miguel Alemán Valdés
to come up with a solution to the Costa Rica-Nicaragua conflict and suggested the possibility of
outside mediation that “could not be construed as intervention.”180 When Costa Rica on
December 3 became the fourteenth state to ratify the Rio Treaty, thus fulfilling the two-thirds
requirement for the treaty to come into force, Sevilla Sacasa’s opportunity had come. A week
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later, on December 10, an unknown number of Calderonistas and Guardia Nacional crossed the
border into the northern parts of Costa Rica, to which Costa Rican Ambassador Esquivel
responded by invoking Article VI of the Rio Treaty on December 11 – thus, calling for outside
mediation that could not be construed as intervention.181 On December 12, Somoza admitted to
the new U.S. Ambassador, George P. Shaw, that the invasion “had occurred because it would
force Figueres’ hand and get the matter settled.”182 Although speculative, the argument can be
made, within reason, that the invasion followed by Costa Rica’s invocation of the Rio Treaty was
part of Somoza’s plan to assist Figueres in getting rid of the Caribbean Legion. Regardless of
whether Somoza actually planned it, the United States would assist the OAS in ridding Costa
Rica of the Legion.
Still, the State Department had a daunting task ahead of it, as the invasion provoked the
remilitarization of Costa Rica. On December 12, Davis reported that the recently “demilitarized”
junta had once again militarized and that the Bella Vista cuartel, which had “converted into a
museum just days ago,” now contained “some 600…members of the Caribbean Legion.” Even
Ulate, the outspoken advocate for pacifism and demilitarization, approached the Ambassador to
discuss the possibility of obtaining 2000 rifles, 100 light machine guns, 100 medium machine
AA guns and armaments for a P-38 fighter aircraft. Though Davis reminded Ulate that the
United States for some time had been unable to sell any equipment to Latin America in general,
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he sent the request to Washington, which was denied.183 The Truman Administration, instead,
placed its faith in the Organization of American States to solve the problem.
On December 14, the OAS convened in Washington to hear the complaints of the Costa
Rican and Nicaraguan delegates. Though the Colombian government reported to the U.S.
embassy that the counterrevolution launched from Nicaragua was aided by communists, the
predominant theme at the meeting was the Caribbean Legion. Costa Rican delegate, Esquivel, in
redefining the accusations levied against Somoza “in more precise terms,” made no mention of
“communism” and, instead, only charged the Román y Reyes government with “aiding a
conspiracy concocted in Nicaragua in order to overthrow the Costa Rican government by force
of arms.” The Nicaraguan delegate, Sevilla Sacasa, responded by specifically denouncing the
Caribbean Legion for “stirring up anxiety and unrest in the Central American Republics.”184 The
council ultimately agreed to appoint a special committee to investigate the charges of both
delegates, thus marking the beginning of the OAS’s first test as a Latin American peacekeeping
machinery.185 Davis worried that the failure on the part of the OAS to quickly bring about a
peaceful resolution would result in an all-out war.186
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Meanwhile in Guatemala, Arévalo assured the U.S. embassy that he was not giving aid to
Figueres, but Ambassador Robert C. Patterson believed that the “circumstantial evidence”
indicated otherwise. Furthermore, on December 17, a U.S. civilian pilot blatantly notified
Patterson that two of his planes “will fly Guatemalan arms and passengers [on] December
18…from Guatemala to San Jose.” Though the Diario de Costa Rica reported that the Caribbean
Legion “has not been in Costa Rica an active threat against any neighboring country,” the State
Department and the OAS knew otherwise, and understood that it was active on an international
level.187
On December 16, the OAS investigating committee, which included William Tapley
Bennett, Jr., Paul C. Daniels, and U.S. Army Colonel T. A. Sapia-Bosch, departed for San
José.188 After a brief visit with Figueres, the committee flew to Managua on December 18 and
wrapped up its investigation, returning to Washington on December 24. The committee
published the “Resolution of December 24, 1948,” which condemned both governments for
abetting foreign revolutionaries in their respective territories and encouraged Figueres and
Somoza to “faithfully observe the principles and rules of nonintervention and solidarity
contained in the various inter-American instruments signed by them.”189 The committee then
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created the Commission of Military Experts, which would ensure that the governments of Costa
Rica and Nicaragua were taking positive steps to rid their territories of foreign revolutionaries.
After the publication of the resolution, both Figueres and Somoza tried playing the
victim. Figueres, in a long national radio broadcast on New Year’s Eve, vehemently denied the
continued existence of the Caribbean Legion, and he emphasized that Costa Rica “had been the
victim of armed invasion from Nicaragua.” Meanwhile in Managua, U.S. Ambassador George P.
Shaw observed that one of the local newspapers criticized the investigative committee’s neutral
resolution for the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis, which had “boxed the ears of both” parties. The
editor complained that the committee should have been more critical of Figueres, rather than
play it safe by blaming both parties, since Nicaragua was innocent.190
However, the Commission of Military Experts ignored these complaints and immediately
went to work in eliminating the regional threats. On January 11, the commission heard rumors of
military equipment arriving in Transportes Aereos Centro Americanos and Lineas Aéreas
Costarricenses airplanes coming from Cuba. When they confronted the Costa Rican foreign
minister, Benjamin Odio, he responded, “The only arms that have entered the country…were
those used in March and April by the Costa Rican Army of Liberation.” Odio then assured the
commission that all of Costa Rica’s airports had been “properly guarded and many had been
barricaded.” The commission demanded more than assurances, though, and requested detailed
information on the specific measures being taken by the junta to control the arms, munitions, and
flights moving in and out of Costa Rica. Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy in Managua demanded
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that the “pro-Government press…quit publishing bitter editorials against Figueres,” as this would
only “lead to frictions in the relations between the two countries.”191
On January 21, Davis reported that the Caribbean Legion was still present in San José
and that the Calderonistas remained active in northern Costa Rica. Davis also heard rumors of
the Guatemalan Ambassador compelling Figueres to return the arms that had been used by
Caribbean Legion during the civil war to Guatemala, since members of the Legion had been
transported to Guatemala.192 It was becoming rather clear to the State Department that the
removal of the Caribbean Legion in Costa Rica, like the removal of the PVP, would not be the
end of it. But first, the immediate dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua needed to be settled
before worrying about the Legion in Guatemala.
During a reception in Managua on January 22, Ambassador Shaw was approached by the
Nicaraguan Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs who hinted that a quick end to the Costa RicaNicaragua Crisis would likely result in the removal of the troublesome Figueres from office. The
Acting Minister informed Shaw that Figueres could defeat the Calderonistas promptly if he
wanted, but that he did not want to, as the crisis had created a “critical situation” and had made
Figueres a “necessary man.” He continued that if “the situation were cleared up…[Figueres]
would have no excuse for staying in power.”193 Whether this conversation had any influence on
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the OAS’s actions is unclear, but it is interesting enough to note that less than a week later, the
OAS delivered a proposed pact of friendship for Costa Rica and Nicaragua to sign. However,
Figueres refused to sign the pact, and on February 7, he asked the Costa Rican constituent
assembly for a six-month extension for the junta “with respect to the serious mission which fate
has bestowed upon it.”194 The assembly approved the extension, and the State Department would
have to deal with the revolutionary president for an additional six months.
More importantly, Somoza would have to deal with an anti-Somocista as the Costa Rican
leader at least until the following May. Since Figueres stayed in office and refused to sign the
agreement, Somoza’s options were narrowing. U.S. Chargé d’Affairs ad Interim Philip P.
Williams noted that while Nicaraguans in general had “no fear of Costa Rica,” Somoza “wants to
get rid of Figueres,” and if the crisis continued any longer, Somoza might take drastic measures.
Meanwhile, Davis expressed his belief that Somoza’s “greatest concern” is the possibility of an
“internal upheaval” in Nicaragua while negotiations continue. The pro-government press in
Managua began criticizing the inaction of the Commission of Military Experts and demanded the
publication of reports from Costa Rica, but this was to no avail.195 The silence from the
commission and the six-month renewal of Figueres’ term in office, matched with internal
instability in Nicaragua, amounted to a ticking time bomb in Central America that the State
Department would have to somehow defuse.
However, on February 16, the U.S. embassy in San José received some good news. Davis
reported that the San José newspapers reported “with a remarkable similarity” that the Caribbean
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Legion was “making plans to leave Costa Rica.” The following day, the military commission
confirmed that there were “no groups of nationals or aliens organized on a military basis in Costa
Rican territory at present.”196 On February 21, Costa Rica and Nicaragua signed the Pact of
Amity, which stated in part:
The Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua agree to prevent
the repetition in the future of events of this nature, through the
constant application by both Governments of effective measures
for the safeguarding of the principles of nonintervention and
continental solidarity, as well as for the faithful observance and
treaties, conventions and other inter-American instruments
intended to ensure peace and good neighborliness.197
The Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis had officially come to an end. Somoza reported that
Calderón was being held under house arrest, and Figueres ridded Costa Rica of most of the
Caribbean Legion.198 Though some remnants of both of the revolutionary armies remained in
Costa Rica and Nicaragua, they did not constitute a large enough threat either for the U.S.
embassy or the State Department to respond.
Conclusion
While the United States preached nonintervention to the American republics, it also
strived to maintain its own posture of strict neutrality during the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis in
order to avoid appearing partial to either government. Throughout the latter half of 1948 and the
first quarter of 1949, the few times high-ranking State Department officials cared to respond to
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open criticisms of the United States during the crisis were only when the Truman Administration
was charged with supporting either Figueres or Somoza.199 Meanwhile, in the eyes of mid- to
low-level State Department officials, both Figueres and Somoza were responsible for the crisis
because both were harboring and aiding revolutionaries. Washington, therefore, strongly
admonished each country not to attack the other, and the embassies worked with the OAS to
come up with a quick solution to bring back regional peace.200
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CHAPTER 4
“WAGING PEACE IN THE AMERICAS”: THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION’S
HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE PLAN

“We are now working out with a number of countries a joint
agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North
Atlantic area…We have already established such a defense
pact for the Western Hemisphere by the treaty of Rio de
Janeiro. The primary purpose of these agreements is to provide
unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the free
countries to resist armed attack from any quarter… If we can
make it sufficiently clear in advance that any armed attack
affecting our national security would be met with
overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur.” –
Harry S. Truman
This chapter defines the Truman Administration’s hemispheric defense plan, which I
argue served as the framework that guided the United States’ actions during the Costa Rican
Revolution of 1948 and the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis of 1948-1949. The Truman
Administration did not think that the most effective way of combatting communism in Latin
America was to outlaw communist parties or forcefully suppress them, since this could lead to
the creation of dangerous, clandestine organizations and Latin American charges of U.S.
imperialism. Therefore, instead of arming Latin American militaries with expensive weapons to
aggressively eradicate local communists, the Truman Administration promoted peaceful
collaboration among all American republics by abandoning its policies of “aloof formality”201
and nonrecognition and, instead, encouraging the continuance of friendly diplomatic relations
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among all American republics. That way the Soviet Union would be discouraged from acting
against an apparently unified Western Hemisphere, lest it “be met with overwhelming force.”202
Clandestine Communism: “The Risks of Mere Suppression”
The most cited document by historians that emerged from the Bogotá Conference was
Resolution XXXII of the Final Act of Bogotá, which denounced “international communism” as a
“totalitarian” ideology.203 Undoubtedly, Resolution XXXII deserves special attention from these
historians, since it would eventually justify U.S. intervention against communist forces in Latin
America.204 However, Resolution XXXII was only one tiny aspect of the U.S. hemispheric
defense plan during the Truman years, and between 1948 and 1952, it served as a preventative,
rather than active, measure. Nowhere did the resolution address the “legal existence of
Communist parties in Latin America” as a “direct threat,” as Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough
suggested.205 On the contrary, the Truman Administration in confidential conversations
(documented below) questioned the effectiveness of outlawing communist parties or
aggressively attacking communist-supported governments because this could lead to a more
dangerous form of clandestine communism.
During the Rio Conference in August 1947, Argentine Foreign Minister Juan Atilio
Bramuglia proposed to Secretary of State George C. Marshall a “secret anti-Communist pact”
that would sever Latin American “relations with the Slav group.” Marshall responded that “the

202

Harry S. Truman, “Inaugural Address on January 20, 1949,” in The Truman Administration: Its Principles and
Practice, ed. Louis W. Koeing, (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1956), 276-7. Italics added.
203
Schifter, Origins of the Cold War, 303; Bethell and Roxborough, “Postwar conjuncture,” 26; Cruz, “Costa Rica,”
294; David Green, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor
Policy, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 284.
204
Roger Trask, “The Impact of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 1 (Summer 1977): 283.
205
“Resolution XXXII: The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America,” Final Act of Bogotá, May 2, 1948, in
FRUS, 1948 IX, 193-4. Italics added; Bethell and Roxborough, “Postwar conjuncture,” 26.

98

measures against Communism could best be left to individual countries,” and, instead, he tried to
convince Bramuglia that Argentina could contribute to the fight against communism by sending
material aid to Western Europe. Marshall compared the communist threat “to a fire from which
[the American republics] were already receiving sparks” and that “it was necessary to stomp out
the fire at the source (Eurasia)…and to maintain our own countries in a healthy (economic)
condition.”206 Shortly after the conference ended, the CIA on September 26 reported that “local
Communists” in Latin America were “isolated from direct Soviet support and operating within
the power orbit of the United States.”207
On March 22, 1948, the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff published PPS-26,
which assessed the communist threat in Latin America.208 While the report acknowledged that
communism in France and Italy could spread to the American republics (many of which had
large Italian and French populations), it concluded that the international communist threat “is a
potential rather than an immediate serious one in Latin America generally.” The Policy Planning
Staff, then, recommended that a study be conducted by the Office of American Republic Affairs
before suggesting that “all Communist parties in the Western Hemisphere [be] declared illegal.”
A resolution encouraging the outlawing of communism in Latin America was therefore never
proposed at Bogotá.209 The United States was simultaneously crafting the North Atlantic Treaty
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Organization, and the creators restricted the treaty to the “North Atlantic” area to keep Latin
American countries and Australia out of the treaty, since “none of those are now directly
threatened by Soviet Communism.”210
In 1949 the National Security Council suggested that the United States should “conduct
an intensified program” to defeat communism “outside the Soviet orbit.”211 However, the Office
of American Republic Affairs rejected the NSC’s proposal of an arms program in Latin America,
and the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff reasoned that the immediate threat in Latin
America seemed to be one of “subversion” by “small but highly organized communist
groups.”212 The communist presence in Latin America in 1949 did not yet require the shipment
of U.S. weapons to suppress it, though, and the scholarly literature does not indicate that the
United States encouraged the outlawing of communist parties.213
In 1950, the Office of American Republic Affairs advised the State Department to take
“steps to lessen the Communist threat in the Americas, but to enter no anti-Communist
agreements with other American Republics.” The Office of American Republic Affairs then
suggested that the U.S. Embassies and their respective Latin American governments only
“exchange information of Communist activities.”214 On March 1, 1950, the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edward G. Miller, Jr., met with Argentine President Juan
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Perón, and Perón indicated his desire to enter into a military pact to provide the means for Latin
American governments to combat communism within the hemisphere. Miller replied that the
Truman Administration’s attitude was “one of working for peace and towards the prevention of
war,” and he concluded that “our policy is to assist in the raising of living standards rather than
to combat Communist influences as such.”215 On May 10, Acting Secretary of State James E.
Webb wrote to the U.S. Embassy in response to the Venezuelan government’s outlawing
communism, stating that the State Department did not believe that “outlawing” the communist
party was the “most effective means” in dealing with the “Commie problem.” Webb further
explained that outlawing would “increase difficulties [of] observation and control,” while
“repression in [the] end tends [to] breed Communism.”216
In 1951, the CIA suggested in vague terms that the United States should help dissipate
“the support of the local Communist party in those countries where one is actively functioning”
by strengthening the will of Latin Americans to resist “internal and external forces of
communism.” However, when listing the global regions where the communist threat was the
greatest, the CIA relegated Latin America to the lowest priority in comparison to Eastern Europe,
Western Europe, Near East and Africa, and the Far East. The CIA also remarked that each of the
other regions were confronted with “Soviet” imperialism, while Latin Americans only faced a
“local” communist threat.217 No suggestion was ever made to outlaw communism in Latin
America.
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In fact, the State Department made it clear that it still did not “advocate the outlawing of
the Communist Party as the most effective way of combatting communism,” and, instead, it
strived to isolate the communist labor and political parties in Latin America by publishing anticommunist propaganda and discouraging noncommunist parties from allying themselves with
communists.218 In Guatemala, where the communist threat was perceived to be the most
dangerous, and where Truman believed that U.S. military aid was necessary, the State
Department still maintained that it should not aggressively act against local communists:
Nothing would harm overall interests of the United States in
Guatemala more than the premature employment of overly
aggressive measures with respect to Guatemalan internal matters.
The communists would be furnished with a valuable weapon
throughout Latin America and would be able to do great harm to
the inter-American system through a revival of mistrust in the
United States and fears of a return to the days of unilateral
intervention and ‘big-stick’ diplomacy.219
In September of 1952, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Rudolf E. Schoenfeld met with
Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz to discuss the increased communist influence in the
government and the population in general. Arbenz reminded Schoenfeld that Guatemala was still
a young democracy and that “it had been the local experience that when attempts were made to
suppress any political movement, it tended to grow.” Schoenfeld agreed, stating that he
“recognized the risks of mere suppression.”220 On November 17, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson met with Guatemalan Ambassador Guillermo Toriello, who told Acheson that the
suppression of communism “would easily lead to dictatorship,” and the government at the
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moment was, instead, “attempting to remove the evils which gave communism a base.” The
Secretary of State did not attempt to correct the Ambassador, nor did he ever suggest to Toriello
that the Guatemalan government should suppress communism.221 Moreover, the United States
discouraged any military adventure, particularly by Nicaragua, against Guatemala since it
“would find it difficult to fight aggression in Korea and be a party to it in this hemisphere.” The
State Department explored the possibility of employing the OAS “to deal with the problem,” but
it first looked into the question of “how much unanimity of opinion there might be concerning its
applicability.”222 Collective intervention never occurred, though, and the Truman Administration
never interfered in the internal affairs of Guatemala to suppress communism.223
Thus, it appears that the Truman Administration perceived communism in Latin America
as a force to be reckoned with through nonviolent means. This did not mean that the Truman
Administration was friendly toward the communist parties, and one can reasonably assume that
if the Truman Administration had perceived there to be an aggressive communist threat lurking
in Latin America, it would have intervened with its military as it had in Korea. However, as the
above evidence suggests, and as the U.S. responses to the Costa Rican Revolution and the Costa
Rica-Nicaragua Crisis reveal, the United States, at the time, did not find it necessary or practical
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to intervene to topple communist-supported governments or to encourage the outlawing of
communist parties, as this might create more dangerous, clandestine organizations and result in
Latin American charges of “Yankee imperialism” and U.S. unilateral intervention.
The Arms Question
The historiography of U.S.-Latin American military relations during the Truman years
proposes two general conclusions: either the Truman Administration ignored Latin America, or it
expected the American republics to use the limited weapons they had to suppress local threats.224
However, the five-year debate (1946 to 1951) surrounding a Latin American arms program
suggests that the United States did not relegate the defense of the hemisphere to the periphery of
its Cold War strategies. Though the War and Defense Departments persistently advocated for the
standardization of Latin American militaries with U.S. training and equipment to keep foreign
influences out of Latin American militaries, the State Department maintained that the potential
financial burden either of military grant aid or weapons sales would create instability in the
forms of internal economic turmoil and disparity in the sizes of Latin American militaries.225
Instead, the State Department promoted the maintenance of healthy economic conditions in Latin
America, which would ideally prevent violence from breaking out in the hemisphere.
The Inter-American Military Cooperation Act (H.R. 6326) was a proposed Latin
American arms standardization bill in 1946 that was designed to replace foreign and antiquated
weapons held by Latin American militaries with upgraded U.S. arms. The War Department
supported the bill, since foreign influences in Latin American militaries during World War II
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cost the United States “a great deal of additional organization and training in [U.S.] concepts of
warfare,” but the State Department opposed it.226 In 1946, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, Spruille Braden, feared that the arms program not only would impose a
financial burden on the American republics but could also inadvertently give new weapons to
communists “already infiltrating Latin American armies.”227 Moreover, in 1947, Under Secretary
of State Dean Acheson argued that the “economic handicaps” imposed by the bill would
“perpetuate and aggravate conditions of economic and political instability,” which “are the soil
in which the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured.”228 H.R. 6326 was ultimately voted down
in Congress.
However, a new bill, H.R. 3836, was introduced to Congress in June 1948, and this time
the bill offered discounted surplus equipment to Latin America. Though the State Department at
first supported the program because it made available cheaper military supplies to Latin
America, the Army’s surplus levels dwindled rapidly with the intensification of the Cold War, as
it went to other parts of the globe that were directly threatened by the Soviet Union. The Director
of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Paul C. Daniels, opposed the new bill in October
because the higher costs of non-surplus equipment would “increase the differences in armed
strength between the wealthier and poorer countries.” H.R. 3836, too, was ultimately rejected.229

226

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Statement before Congress on the Proposed Inter-American Military Cooperation Act
(H.R. 6326),” May 28, 1946, United States, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Military
Cooperation Act, Hearings before the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Seventy-Ninth Congress,
Second Section, on May 28, 29, 1946, 14.
227
Spruille Braden to James F. Byrnes, “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State to the Secretary of
State,” December 16, 1946, FRUS, 1946 XI, 108-9.
228
Dean Acheson to Robert P. Patterson, “The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War,” March 19, 1947,
FRUS, 1947 VIII, 106.
229
“Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense,” June 19, 1948, FRUS, 1948 IX, 217; Paul
C. Daniels to George C. Marshall, “The Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs to the Secretary of
State,” October 5, 1948, FRUS, 1948 IX, 223-224.

105

The debates surrounding a Latin American arms program persisted into the 1950s. On the
one hand, the Department of Defense still worried that in the absence of an arms program, Latin
American governments would be prone to allowing foreign influences, including communism,
into its militaries. On the other hand, the State Department did not want to bankrupt its southern
allies, whom the United States deprived of a Latin American Marshall Plan.230 In response to the
National Security Council’s claim that Washington was “obligated” to furnish weapons to Latin
America, the Policy Planning Staff in 1949 quoted, in part, a speech that Truman gave to
Congress in May 1946, regarding H.R. 6326:
This Government will not…in any way approve of, nor will it
participate in, the indiscriminate or unrestricted distribution of
armaments, which would only contribute to a useless and
burdensome arms race…[I]t is the policy of this Government to
encourage the establishment of sound economic conditions in the
other American Republics which will contribute to the
improvement of living standards and the advancement of social
and cultural welfare. Such conditions are a prerequisite to
international peace and security.231
Two years later, Congress passed the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which provided worldwide
military grant assistance. Latin America received just 0.6 percent of the program’s total military
aid.232 As historian Chester J. Pach, Jr., concisely noted, “Cold War thinking actually
restrained…U.S. military aid to Latin America.”233
This five-year debate reveals three aspects of the Truman Administration’s hemispheric
policy at the start of the Cold War. First, the security of the hemisphere held a position of
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relatively high priority in Washington. The State Department believed that Latin America, at the
time, was relatively safe from Soviet communism, and the higher-ups in the Office of American
Republic Affairs wanted to keep it that way. Had top State Department officials like Dean
Acheson ignored Latin America, or relegated it to a low priority, they would not have
persistently blocked the Defense Department’s multiple attempts to arm Latin America. From the
State Department’s perspective, bankrupting and destabilizing Latin America with expensive
weapons would have the inadvertent effect of bringing the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere.
Second, the State Department had the final say in planning the defense of the hemisphere. This is
especially evident during the Bogotá Conference when Marshall made the unilateral decision,
despite the Defense Department’s objections, not to push the issue of multilateral defense
agreements, giving each country access to other Latin American military bases in case of an
attack on the hemisphere.234 Third, the significance of the hemispheric defense plan did not lie in
the weapons sent to Latin America and, therefore, did not make the Latin American militaries
responsible for suppressing communist activities within their countries’ borders. Instead, the
United States encouraged all American states to cooperate with each other through peaceful
collaboration in order to keep Soviet communism outside of the hemisphere.
Resolution XXXV and Peaceful Collaboration
The passage of Resolution XXXV at the Bogotá Conference marked the end of the
Truman Administration’s policies of aloof formality and nonrecognition.235 Two of the most
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cited examples of these policies between 1946 and 1948 were the United States’ publication of
the Blue Book on Argentina and its nonrecognition of Nicaragua’s de facto government. The
abandonment of aloof formality and nonrecognition, in large part, had to do with the
intensification of the Cold War and the necessity for the United States to create regional defense
systems to counteract the Soviet Union’s aggression. In order to accomplish this, all the
American republics, including Argentina and Nicaragua, needed to be part of the Rio Treaty and
the Organization of American States, thus necessitating Washington’s shift away from aloof
formality and nonrecognition toward peaceful collaboration.
On February 11, 1946, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs
Spruille Braden published, and circulated throughout all of Latin America, the Blue Book on
Argentina, which denounced Argentine President Edelmiro J. Farrell’s regime for collaborating
with the Nazis during World War II.236 However, the Blue Book was an abysmal failure, and
historian Steven Schwartzberg noted that it arguably led to the election of Farrell’s chosen
presidential candidate, Juan Perón.237 Still, the Truman Administration continued pressuring the
Argentine government to get rid of its Nazi influences by not permitting it a seat at the Rio
Conference. That was until the Cold War intensified after the announcement of the Truman
Doctrine on March 12, 1947, when the President denounced communism in Greece and Turkey.
In April, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee warned the Truman Administration that
“anything less than rapprochement” between the United States and “every one of its neighbors to
the south” was “entirely unacceptable.” This warning was largely directed at the State
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Department, which was working to finalize the regional defense systems it had started planning
in 1945. Since Brazil and most of the American republics refused to attend the Rio Conference
without Argentina’s participation, the State Department found no other solution but to fully
resume normal relations with Perón. On June 26, 1947, the Truman Administration removed all
trade sanctions against Argentina, and the Rio Conference began on August 15 with Argentina
participating.238
During the conference, on August 27, the Guatemalan delegation made a motion to insert
into Article VI of the Rio Treaty a statement denouncing any act that endangers “the democratic
structure of American governments.” Arthur H. Vandenberg of the U.S. delegation, in
concurrence with the Argentine, Dominican, and Honduran delegations, considered the
“Guatemalan language as outside the proper scope of the treaty.” An overwhelming majority,
then, voted down the Guatemalan proposal, with only Guatemala and Cuba voting in favor of
it.239 Vandenberg’s statement made it clear that the State Department was more interested in
promoting peace between democracies and dictatorships in order to create the inter-American
alliance than it was in encouraging democratic forms of government.
Still, the United States refused to recognize de facto governments that had come to power
through the use of force. For this reason, the Román y Reyes government in Nicaragua, which
had entered office through a coup d’état on May 26, 1947, was not allowed to attend the Rio
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Conference.240 This posed a problem for the Truman Administration in creating a solidified
hemisphere united against the Soviet Union.241 On December 31, though, the Costa Rican and
Dominican governments extended their recognition to Nicaragua. Acting Secretary of State
Robert A. Lovett believed that this constituted an “important change in [the] previously existing
situation where all American Republics were pursuing [a] similar course of action in withholding
recognition,” and the Truman Administration began working on a policy to recognize all forms
of government.242 The American republics and the United States, then, agreed that Nicaragua
should participate in the upcoming Bogotá Conference in March, and on April 25, Resolution
XXXV was passed, which declared:
1. That continuity of diplomatic relations among American states is
desirable.
2. That the right of maintaining, suspending or resuming
diplomatic relations with another government shall not be
exercised as a means of individually obtaining unjustified
advantages under international law.
3. That the establishment or maintenance of diplomatic relations
with a government does not imply any judgment upon the domestic
policy of that government.243
Nicaragua was immediately recognized by the United States, thus marking the end of Truman’s
policy of diplomatic intervention, and, thereafter, all Latin American states were encouraged to
continue normal diplomatic relations with one another and operate in peaceful collaboration.244
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Truman’s Hemispheric Defense Plan and the New Threat
One can conclude, then, that in the absence of a Latin American arms program, the U.S.
military expected to bear much of the burden in defending the hemisphere from an external
attack.245 Still, Truman sent a clear message to the Soviet Union, through Resolution XXXII, that
the American republics and the United States were united under a military alliance that
denounced international communism as a totalitarian ideology. Moreover, in his inaugural
address in 1949, Truman warned the USSR that it would be met with “overwhelming force” by
the signing participants of the Rio Treaty and NATO if it attempted to attack the United States.
In order to keep up the appearance of a strong, unified military alliance, the United States needed
all the Latin American republics to continue normal diplomatic relations with one another under
Resolution XXXV. At the same time, the United States sought to obtain “rapprochement” with
all its southern neighbors, thus discouraging Truman from intervening in the internal affairs of
the American republics. The State Department also feared that the outlawing of communist
parties would prevent the American governments from being able to closely observe communist
activities within their respective territories.
Therefore, I argue that Truman’s hemispheric defense plan did not rely on the weak Latin
American militaries to attack overt or suppress subversive communist threats, and, instead, it
promoted peaceful collaboration among all American states in order to convince the Soviet
Union that the United States and Latin America were united under a tightly knit military alliance
with one common enemy: international communism. The direct threat to the Western
Hemisphere, from the Truman Administration’s perspective, was not the local communist parties
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or communist-supported governments in Latin America but, rather, regional violence that would
indicate a chink in the inter-American armor. In other words, it would not have made sense for
the United States to help Figueres start a revolt in Costa Rica that could potentially draw in the
involvement of other American states, which in turn could potentially attract the Soviet Union to
a divided Latin America – an area that the Truman Administration believed was relatively safe
from the dangers of the Cold War.246
The Costa Rican Revolution, the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis, and the Venezuelan coup,
all occurring within the same year, frustrated Truman’s hemispheric defense plan. The State
Department issued a press release on December 21, 1948, stating that violence in politics was not
only “deplorable,” but also “a danger to all the countries of this hemisphere.”247 On September
10, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson in a speech to the Pan American Society assured them that
the American republics “are relatively remote from any direct threat” and that they “are in a real
sense waging peace in the Americas.” Acheson then identified the real threat to the Western
Hemisphere:
For more than two years the Caribbean area has been disturbed by
plots and counterplots. These plots have in themselves been
inconsistent with our common commitments not to intervene in
each other’s affairs…Since 1945 few nations in the Caribbean area
have escaped involvement, and at times the entire area has
approached a state of political turmoil…Aggression or plotting
against any nation of this hemisphere is of concern to us. Wherever
it occurs, or may be threatened, we shall use our strongest efforts
in keeping with our international commitments to oppose it and to
defend the peace of the hemisphere.248
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This policy seems to have been consistent throughout the entirety of Truman’s tenure as
President.249
Conclusion: Cold War Intervention in Latin America – Truman’s Legacy?
After Dwight D. Eisenhower won the presidential election in 1952, he charged the
Truman Administration with being too “soft on communism.” Immediately, Eisenhower
reimplemented the Monroe Doctrine of unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of the
American republics, and his Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, relabeled the
communists in Guatemala as “disciplined agents of international Communism, preaching
authentic Soviet-dictated doctrine.”250 In 1953, the Eisenhower Administration began planning
the overthrow of Arbenz, and Eisenhower directed the CIA to support the Guatemalan rebels led
by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. Operation PBSUCCESS, as it was called,
officially began on June 18, 1954, when Castillo Armas invaded Guatemala from Honduras and
overthrew Arbenz a little over a week later, thus constituting the first indisputable instance of
U.S. military intervention in Latin America since the start of the Cold War.251 The U.S. policy of
nonintervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries had officially come to an end.
Throughout the rest of the Cold War, Washington would be involved in various attempted coups
in Latin America, successful and unsuccessful, most notably in Cuba (1961), Chile (1970), and
Nicaragua (1979-1990).
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Though the overthrow of Arbenz is the first indisputable case of unilateral intervention
by the United States in Latin America after World War II, some historians have argued that
Eisenhower’s interventionist policies were a continuation of Truman’s old policies, thus
crediting Truman with inaugurating Cold War intervention in Latin America.252 However, no
direct evidence has yet been presented that might indicate Truman’s participation in the
outlawing of communism or the overthrowing of governments south of the Rio Grande.
This thesis, therefore, has challenged the assumption that Truman inaugurated Cold War
intervention in Latin America and has offered evidence that suggests otherwise. Ultimately, I
wholly support Leslie Bethell’s and Ian Roxborough’s call for more research on U.S.-Latin
American relations during the Truman years: “We need to know more about the precise
mechanisms by which the Cold War arrived in Latin America, how far anticommunism was
sponsored by the United States, how it meshed with existing anticommunism and
conservatism.”253 For now, though, it is probably safe to assume that the Cold War in Latin
America is Eisenhower’s legacy – not Truman’s.
The Truman Administration’s actions in Costa Rica from 1947 to 1949 fell in line with
its broader Latin American policy. Washington did not intervene forcefully to outlaw or defeat
the PVP; it never sent weapons to Figueres to violently suppress communists in Costa Rica; and
it helped bring about peace between Costa Rica and Nicaragua during the Costa Rica-Nicaragua
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Crisis. The State Department understood that Latin America was relatively safe from the dangers
of the Cold War, and to keep it that way, the Truman Administration helped to maintain peace in
Central America.
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CONCLUSION

In February and March of 1950, George F. Kennan, Counselor to the Secretary of State,
toured Latin America for the first time in his life, and, upon his return, he wrote a report on
March 29 for Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Kennan concluded that “the activities of the
communists represent our most serious problem in the area.” While admitting that the
communists in Latin America had practiced their own unique brand of communism and that their
“bond with Moscow is tenuous and indirect,” the Counselor opined that United States had “no
justification for complacency about communist activities in this hemisphere.”254
He advised the State Department to follow the example of nineteenth-century U.S.
politicians and use the Monroe Doctrine to expel communism from the hemisphere. Kennan
complained that the new inter-American system, “over which the State Department has little
control,” was an obstacle to Washington’s removing communism from Latin America, and he
suggested that the Truman Administration reassert its dominance over the Western Hemisphere.
It is important for us to keep before ourselves and the Latin
American peoples at all times the reality of the thesis that we are a
great power; that we are by and large much less in need of them
than they are in need of us; that we are entirely prepared to leave to
themselves those who evince no particular desire for the forms of
collaboration that we have to offer; that the danger of a failure to
exhaust the possibilities of our mutual relationship is always
greater to them than to us; that we can afford to wait, patiently and
good naturedly; and that we are more concerned to be respected
than to be liked or understood.255
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Kennan’s report has been cited by historians as evidence of the Truman Administration’s
shift in 1950 toward supporting strongarm dictatorships over weaker democracies in order to rid
the hemisphere of communists, a policy that succeeding administrations would follow.256
Particularly, Bethell, Roxborough, and LaFeber, three of the most well-known historians to have
studied U.S.-Latin American relations in the twentieth century, have made this argument based
on Kennan’s comments. Bethell and Roxborough concluded from the report that in the “new
conditions of the cold war,” the Truman Administration determined that “if dictatorships (in
Latin America) proved more effective at dealing with communism…they might be preferable to
democracies.”257 Although LaFeber did not cite Kennan’s report, he made a similar argument
based on the Counselor’s comments made during his tour of Latin America, one of which was:
“It is better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and
relaxed and penetrated by Communists.”258
Without a doubt, the highly influential Kennan advocated for the reassertion of U.S.
dominance in Latin America by supporting and arming strong dictators who would take drastic
measures to suppress communist influences within their respective countries’ boundaries, and
future administrations, indeed, would adopt this policy. However, Bethell, Roxborough, and
LaFeber missed one important point: The State Department under Truman rejected Kennan’s
comments. In Memoirs: 1925-1950, a retired Kennan recounted Edward G. Miller, Jr.’s and
Acheson’s reactions to his report:
[T]he report came as a great shock to people in the operational
echelons of the department, so much that the Assistant Secretary
for Latin America immediately persuaded the Secretary…to forbid
256
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its distribution within the department and to have all copies of it
locked away and hidden from innocent eyes which was promptly
done.259
The report seems to have had virtually zero effect on Truman’s Latin American policies.260
When I started researching Truman’s and Eisenhower’s responses to Costa Rica’s
disbanding its military, I ran across Kirk Bowman’s claim that the United States “exerted
considerable influence in an attempt to militarize Costa Rica” after it disbanded its military,
without specifying which administration. His evidence came from an interview in 1997 with
Gonzalo Facio, who had served as the president of the Legislative Assembly during Figueres’
first presidency in 1953. Facio recalled, “We received great pressure from the United States [to
remilitarize] so that we would form a modern army here. They wanted to give us equipment and
training and everything. We said no.”261
The glaring problem in Bowman’s claim is that the reader cannot determine from the text
which administration tried remilitarizing Costa Rica or when it occurred. Since Bowman was
discussing the early 1950s, it can be assumed that he meant the Truman and Eisenhower
Administrations. Truman certainly did not attempt to remilitarize Costa Rica, though. As was
highlighted in chapter three, the Truman Administration consistently discouraged the purchase of
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U.S. weapons by the revolutionary junta throughout the latter half of 1948, and the issue was not
brought up again until Ulate entered office. When Ulate took over, he asked to purchase military
equipment from the United States, and Truman obliged this request. However, Ulate could not
afford the arms, so the agreement was never finalized.262 In failing to purchase U.S. weapons
through private channels, Ulate requested grant aid from the United States, but Truman denied
this request.263 Ultimately, Costa Rica never received a single weapon from the United States
while Truman was in office, thus suggesting that there was no sense of urgency on Truman’s part
to militarize Costa Rica.
Eisenhower, on the other hand, actually withheld $487,734 worth of weapons from Costa
Rica, which were purchased with cash by Figueres in 1954. In fact, it was Figueres who placed
“a great deal of pressure” on U.S. General Russell L. Vittrup to have the weapons shipped. Still,
Eisenhower delayed the order until Figueres condemned Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in
front of the OAS for abetting communism in Guatemala.264
Of course, Kennan’s report and the United States’ continued military relations with Costa
Rica are outside of the scope of this thesis, but the point I am emphasizing is that some of the
key pieces of evidence that have been used to define the Truman Administration’s Latin
American policy have been weak, at best, and misused, at worst.265 This thesis has highlighted
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John L. Ohmans, “Costa Rican Arms,” April 15, 1952, NARA, RG 59, 718.56/4-1552; Philip B. Fleming, “Costa
Rican Arm Exchange,” August 11, 1952, NARA, RG 59, 718.5 MSP/8-1152.
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Holden, Armies Without Nations, 219.
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Holden, Armies Without Nations, 220; Charles R. Burrows, “Memorandum of Conversation with General Vittrup
of the Department of Defense,” May 28, 1954, NARA, RG 59, 718.5 MSP/5-2854; Burrows, “Costa Rican Arms
Purchase,” June 4, 1954, NARA, RG 59, 718.56/6-454; Raymond G. Leddy, “Costa Rica’s Insistence on Arms
Acquisition,” June 10, 1954, NARA, RG 59, 718.56/6-1054; John Foster Dulles, “The Secretary of State to the
Embassy in Nicaragua,” July 1, 1954, NARA, RG 59, 718.5-MSP/7-154.
265
For example, LaFeber misinterpreted the speech Edward G. Miller, Jr. gave on May 15, 1950, that was published
in the Department of State Bulletin. LaFeber argued that the “Miller Doctrine of 1950” was a warning to the
American republics that “the United States reserves the right to intervene unilaterally” by “send[ing] in the
marines” if they refused to behave. – LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 97, 99; However, nowhere in Miller’s speech
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and challenged the historiographical consensus, which was formed on circumstantial evidence,
that the Truman Administration encouraged the outlawing of communist parties and the
overthrowing of various governments. Historians who have accepted these two premises can
only arrive at the conclusion that Truman’s Latin American policy was one of “confusion,”
“division,” and “contradictory desires.” However, it appears that Truman’s Latin American
policy was much more defined and consistent than what historians have suggested.
To recap, I have argued that the Truman Administration promoted peace between Costa
Rica and Nicaragua in order to maintain the outward appearance that the entire Latin American
region was united under the protective umbrella of the United States against Soviet communism.
The U.S. embassy in San José remained a cautious player during the Costa Rican presidential
election campaign of 1948, and it maintained a posture of strict neutrality throughout the Costa
Rican Revolution and the Costa Rica-Nicaragua Crisis. Furthermore, the Truman Administration
attempted to isolate the Revolution by discouraging Guatemalan and Nicaraguan intervention,
and the U.S. embassies worked with the OAS to bring a quick end to the Costa Rica-Nicaragua
Crisis. Finally, although Truman and Ulate had entered two arms agreements in the 1950s, U.S.
weapons, for various reasons, were never shipped to Costa Rica during the Truman years,
suggesting that the Truman Administration did not possess a sense of urgency to ship U.S.
weapons to Costa Rica to violently suppress communism. Truman’s Costa Rican policy,
therefore, appears to have been in sync with his broader Latin American policy of peaceful
collaboration.

did he warn that the United States reserved the right to unilaterally intervene, and, instead, he stated that
unilateral intervention by the United States “died a universally unlamented death” and would no longer be the
policy to uphold the Monroe Doctrine. Instead, the Rio Treaty, through collective action, would replace the
outdated method of unilateral intervention. See Edward G. Miller, Jr., “Nonintervention and Collective
Responsibility in the Americas,” Department of State Bulletin 22, May 15, 1950, 768-770.
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